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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20000044-CA 
v. : 
JOSE MARIO JIMINEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of manslaughter, a second degree 
felony, and two counts of attempted manslaughter, each third degree felonies. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mid-trial motion for 
mistrial where the incidents of alleged prosecutorial misconduct were four isolated 
questions spread out over the course of a four-day trial? 
"On appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct, because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's 
impact on the proceedings, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
1113,1118 (Utah App. 1995). "'Unless a review of the record shows that the court's 
decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the 
defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's 
decision was an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 274-75 (Utah 
1998) (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)) 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for 
mistrial at the end of closing argument where the prosecutor's comments in 
closing did not undermine defendant's right not to be tried in prison clothes 
but, rather, addressed only the evidence before the jury and the inferences 
concerning defendant's credibility arising therefrom? 
The same standard of review applies to this issue as applies to Issue I. 
III. Should defendant receive a new trial based on the cumulative error doctrine 
where defendant has not demonstrated that any of the alleged errors 
collectively deprived him of a fair trial? 
A court will reverse a conviction under the cumulative error doctrine "only if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules determine this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 29,1998, defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
of criminal homicide, a first degree felony; with two counts of attempted criminal 
homicide, also first degree felonies; and with firearm enhancements, all in connection 
with a shooting at a local 7-Eleven store (R. 4-7, 12-14). Before trial, defendant filed 
several motions in limine, including one requesting the exclusion of prior crimes evidence 
(R. 151-56, 193-94, 339, 343:168-75). The trial court accepted the parties' stipulation 
that the State would not address defendant's prior convictions except to rebut any 
character evidence offered by defendant (R. 339:20, 343:172-75). 
At trial, defendant made two motions for mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct. The trial court denied both motions (R. 344:455-76; R. 345:708-11). 
After a four-day trial, defendant was convicted by jury of one count of 
manslaughter and two counts of attempted manslaughter (R. 282-87). The jury also found 
that defendant had used a firearm in each of those crimes (Id.). 
Defendant was sentenced to one to fifteen years and a consecutive firearm 
enhancement term on the manslaughter count, and to zero to five years and a consecutive 
firearm enhancement term on each of the attempted manslaughter counts (R. 308-16). 
The trial court ordered that defendant's manslaughter term run consecutive to his 
concurrent attempted manslaughter terms (Id.). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 321). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 20,1996, defendant opened fire on three unarmed men in a 7-Eleven 
parking lot. Two of the men were able to shelter themselves from harm. The third was 
killed when defendant fired two bullets at point blank range into his chest as he sat in a 
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parked car. The shooting and killing were recorded by the store's security camera (St. 
Exh. 1). 
On October 20, 1996, Henry David Miera went out with his girlfriend, Daphne 
Sanchez, and friends Manuel Rios and Anthony Montoya to a bar named Shooters (R. 
343:226-27, 271-72; St. Exh. 6 at 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 3). After drinking and dancing, the 
foursome left the bar, stopped for more beer, and took Ms. Sanchez home (Id.). The three 
men then stopped at a 7-Eleven so that Rios could use the restroom (Id.). Miera was in 
the driver's seat; Montoya was on the passenger side (R. 343:232; St. Exh. 6 at 1-2). 
Rios, a former boxer who weighed about 330 pounds, went into the store (R. 343:233; St. 
Exh. 1). It was about 1:22 a.m. (Id.). 
Rios was still in the store when a black car pulled in next to Miera's white one (R. 
343:233; St. Exh. 1). Defendant's wife got out of the passenger's side of the black car 
and went into the store to use the restroom (R. 344: 434-35,442; St. Exh. 1). Defendant 
got out of the driver's side and, after retrieving his gun from under his seat and sticking it 
in the front of his pants, approached the white car (R. 343:232-42; R. 344:562, 570; St. 
Exh. 1). Defendant asked Montoya and Miera whether they had a problem, i.e., whether 
they "wantfed] to fight or something" (R. 343:244; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 3). 
Rios, hearing the confrontation, quickly left the store and asked defendant whether 
he had a problem (R. 343:234-35,245,247; R. 344:562; St. Exh. 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 6). 
Montoya, who was slightly smaller than Rios, got out of the car and joined Rios (R. 
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343:235, 246; St. Exh. 1). Miera, however, remained in the car, "just sitting" there, 
saying nothing (R. 343:235; St. Exh. 1). 
Despite the fact that defendant was much smaller than Rios and Montoya, he 
showed no sign of backing down when they approached him (R. 343:245-46; St. Exh. 1; 
Def. Exh. 3 A at 4). Instead, defendant reached for the gun in the front of his pants (R. 
343:236-37, 277). In response, Rios punched defendant and then turned immediately and 
ran to the other side of the white car, "just duckin"' (R. 343:236-37; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 
at 5; Def. Exh. 3A at 5-7). Montoya followed Rios as defendant fell backwards to the 
ground (R. 344:438; St. Exh. 1). Miera opened his car door but then quickly shut it again 
because defendant, though still on the ground, had opened fire (R. 344:438-39, 501, 546-
47; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 3-5, 7; Def. Exh. 3A at 5). 
As defendant got up from the ground, he shot into the driver's side of the car and 
killed Miera (R. 343:237-38, 298, 301; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 5). One of the shots went 
through Miera's rib, lung, and heart (R. 343:295-96). The second shot hit Miera's 
diaphragm, spleen, aorta, liver, and lung (Id.). Defendant then moved in front of the car 
and, after apparently clearing a gun jam, continued firing on Rios and Montoya (R. 
343:237-38; R: 344:548; St. Exh. 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 5). 
During the shooting, defendant's wife took cover behind a 7-Eleven door (R. 
344:443; St. Exh. 1). Defendant then signaled to her to get back into their car (R. 
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343:238; R. 344:440; St. Exh. 1). As defendant drove away, Rios and Montoya threw 
beer bottles and firewood at defendant's car (R. 343:238; R. 344:440). 
After realizing that Miera had been shot, Rios and Montoya pulled him out of the 
car and tried to revive him (St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 10; Def. Exh.. at 9). Paramedics soon 
arrived and Miera was eventually transported to the hospital by helicopter (R. 343:305, 
313-14; R. 344:543; St. Exh. 1). 
After the shooting, defendant parked his car in the garage of a friend, Amber 
Fabela (R. 343:192, 316; R:444:448). He and his wife then went over to another friend's 
home, which turned out to be where Amber also was (R. 343:186-87). Defendant, "in 
hysterics," told them, "I just killed somebody" (R. 343:187). Defendant then fled; his 
wife did not see him again for two years (R. 344:478, 591). 
Police arrived at the 7-Eleven shortly after the shooting and found five slugs and 
seven casings around or implanted in the white car (R. 343:308, 309, 313, 343). 
Although defendant later claimed Miera had a gun, no gun was found at the scene (R. 
343:219, 233, 309-10, 315; St. Exh. 6 at 8). Rios testified that if he had had a gun, he 
would have used it (R. 343:238). 
Additional facts. Additional facts will be included in the relevant portions of the 
argument section of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct fail. None of the instances of 
alleged misconduct were significant enough to call an improper matter to the jury's 
attention. Furthermore, none of the alleged misconduct, considered individually or 
collectively, was so substantial and prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MID-TRIAL MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
WHERE NONE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTIONS ROSE TO 
THE LEVEL OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Defendant claims that four questions asked by the prosecutor over the course of a 
four-day were so prejudicial to his case that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his mid-trial motion for mistrial. See Aplt. Br. at 10-34. However, none of the alleged 
errors were sufficiently substantial or prejudicial to warrant a new trial. 
A. Defendant's claim that the State committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by blatantly violating the trial court's pre-
trial order fails on the merits where it made no reference 
to defendant's prior bad acts during its case-in-chief. 
Defendant claims that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by 
"interjecting]... improper, offensive information . . . [i]n blatant disregard" for the trial 
court's pre-trial ruling on his motion in limine. Aplt. Br. at 20. Defendant's claim fails, 
however, because the State did not violate the court's order at trial. 
On April 23,1999, defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence of 
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Prior Convictions, requesting that evidence of prior offenses be excluded under rules 402, 
403, and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 151-52, 155-56). Twice before trial, the State 
stipulated that it would not elicit any evidence concerning defendant's prior convictions 
or bad acts in its case-in-chief (R. 339:20; R. 343:173-75; Addendum A). However, both 
times, the State reserved the right to present such evidence if defendant "is going to bring 
in his character for being a peaceable person in the furtherance of a self-defense claim" 
(R. 193-94; R. 339:20; R. 343:169, 173-75; Add. A). Defendant accepted the stipulation 
(R. 339:20; Add. A). The court then ruled that it would take the State's motion under 
advisement, noting that if, in presenting his case, "Mr. Jiminez has placed his character at 
issue, . . . clearly the State would be entitled to rebut" (R. 343:175; Add. A).1 
Consistent with its prior stipulation and the trial court's pre-trial order, the State 
presented no evidence concerning defendant's prior convictions in its case-in-chief (R. 
343:182-349). The State did not, therefore, violate the trial court's pre-trial order. 
B. The impact on the jury in a four-day trial from four 
allegedly improper questions posed by the prosecutor, 
three of which went unanswered after objection, was not 
so substantial and prejudicial as to constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor "circumvented evidentiary rules . . . on four 
separate occasions in order to get information in front of the jury that it was not allowed 
!In the record, defendant's last name appears both as Jiminez and Jimenez. In this 
brief, the State will use the spelling, "Jiminez." 
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to consider." Aplt. Br. 10, 12. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's misconduct "was 
particularly contemptuous in this case" because, "in a deliberate fashion, the prosecutor 
interjected the improper, offensive information in an effort to influence and inflame the 
jury... [i]n blatant disregard of the rules." Aplt. Br. at 20. 
In support of his claim, defendant identifies four questions asked by the prosecutor 
in cross examination during the second and third days of a four-day trial. See Aplt. Br. at 
13-18. Specifically, defendant challenges one question directed at defendant concerning 
his use of aliases; one question directed at his wife concerning whether she knew it was 
illegal for defendant to carry a concealed weapon; one question directed at his wife 
concerning whether she assisted that night in concealing defendant; and one question 
directed at his medical expert concerning other violence to which defendant may have 
been exposed in the past. See Aplt. Br. at 13-18. 
However, to succeed on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must 
show both that the prosecutor called to the jury's attention a matter it would not be 
justified in considering in reaching its verdict, and that, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, the prosecutor's comments were so substantial and prejudicial that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that, absent the comments, the result of the trial would have been 
more favorable to defendant. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7; State v. 
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352-53 (Utah 1997); State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah 
App. 1998). Defendant has not done so here. Notwithstanding the emotionally-charged 
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language in defendant's brief, none of the prosecutor's questions constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct warranting a new trial under this test. 
1. Proceedings below. 
Defendant's use of aliases. Defendant was the first person to testify for the 
defense (R. 343:363). He did so in order to lay foundation for subsequent expert 
testimony concerning the effects of prior head trauma on how defendant would likely 
respond to being punched by Rios at the 7-Eleven (R. 343:349, 363-69). 
In laying the necessary foundation, defendant explained that he had been robbed 
and attacked with clubs by three or four different people in 1994 (R. 343:371; Addendum 
B). The medical records produced from the attack, however, were in the name of Antonio 
Sanchez (R. 343:366; Add. B). Defendant explained that he had used an alias to procure 
medical treatment "[b]ecause I didn't have money to pay the bills" (R. 343:366; Add. B). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "These aren't the only other false 
names that you've used, are they?" (R. 343:369; Add. B). Before defendant could 
answer, his counsel objected and requested an unrecorded side-bar conference {Id.). 
Upon completion of the side-bar, the prosecutor did not renew his question concerning 
aliases (R. 343:369; Add. B). The prosecutor moved on to a different subject and did not 
revisit the issue at any time during the remaining two days of trial (R. 343:369; Add. B). 
Defendant's violent history. Robert Keith Rothfeder, defendant's medical expert, 
testified that, because of the 1994 trauma, defendant would likely react more vigorously 
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to the 7-Eleven incident than would one who had suffered no prior head trauma (R. 
344:382, 398-99). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if defendant had given Rothfeder "any 
other history of violence that he has had" (R. 344:403; Addendum C). Defendant 
objected to the question and an off-the-record side-bar was held (Id.). After the trial court 
overruled defendant's objection, the prosecutor reworded his question to address "other 
history of violence that [defendant's] been involved in" (Id.). Rothfeder indicated that he 
had asked defendant about any other history of serious trauma and that defendant had 
indicated there was none (R. 344:404; Add. C). After Rothfeder's response, the 
prosecutor did not revisit the issue of defendant's violent history again throughout the 
remainder of the trial. 
Defendant's illegal possession of a concealed weapon. Defendant's wife was the 
next witness called (R. 344:430). She testified that, on the night of the shooting, she and 
her husband had gone to Mi Mexico (R. 344:433). She explained that they didn't get a 
chance to go out much with a nine-month-old child, and that, on that night, they stayed at 
the club for about four hours (R. 344:433). She testified that she did not see her husband 
with a gun until after he had been punched by Rios (R. 344:444). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "Did you know that the concealed 
weapon under that circumstance would be a crime in and of itself?" (R. 344:444; 
Addendum D). Before Ms. Jiminez could answer, defense counsel objected and 
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requested an unrecorded side-bar (Id.). The trial court then sustained defendant's 
objection on the record but declined defendant's request for a curative instruction (R. 
344:445; Add. D). Defendant never placed on the record either the basis for his objection 
or the substance of the instruction he apparently requested. 
The prosecutor revisited the subject matter of its question only in response to 
defendant's closing argument (R. 345:694; Add. D). In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued 
that the important question was not whether, as defendant had argued, defendant had a 
constitutional right to possess a firearm or not, but, rather, whether possession of the 
firearm at that particular time was probative of defendant's state of mind when he 
approached the white car (R. 345:694-95; Add. D).2 
Defendant's flight. Also during cross-examination of Ms. Jiminez, the prosecutor 
asked whether she had participated in concealing defendant from the police after the 
shooting (R. 344:450; Addendum E). Defendant objected and outside the presence of the 
jury, the court explained that an answer to that question could be self-incriminating (R. 
344:451; Add. E). Defendant stated: "If the question is what did she observe, I think 
that's a proper question" (R. 344:453; Add. E). 
2In denying defendant's motion for a mistrial at the close of argument, the court 
ruled that, although arguing propensity to violate the law is a touchy area, the State could 
properly argue that defendant's possession of the concealed gun went to defendant's state 
of mind at the time of the confrontation and supported the inference that defendant was 
the aggressor (R. 345:708-10; Add. D). Defendant has not challenged this portion 
of the State's closing argument on appeal. 
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When the jury returned, the court stated: 'Til sustain the objection that was made 
earlier by defense counsel and ask [the State] to move to a new line of questioning" (R. 
344:477; Add. E). The prosecutor then questioned Ms. Jiminez regarding whether she 
observed defendant concealing himself to avoid arrest after the shooting (R. 344:477; 
Add. E). 
Defendant moves for mistrial. During a break in Ms. Jiminez's testimony, 
defendant moved for a mistrial (R. 344:455; Addendum F). Defendant argued that the 
State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it asked defendant whether he had used 
aliases other than Antonio Sanchez, when it asked defendant's medical expert whether he 
was aware of any other prior violence with which defendant had been involved other than 
the alleged 1994 incident; and when it alluded to uncharged 404(b) evidence during its 
questioning of defendant's wife (R. 344:456-57,463; Add. F). 
Defendant argued that the State's question about defendant's use of other aliases 
was improper innuendo because it was not supported by admissible evidence (R. 344:457; 
Add. F). Defendant challenged the State's question to his medical expert on the same 
basis (R. 344:463; Add. F). In response, the State presented to court with State's Exh. 9, 
an FBI rap sheet identifying various aliases used by defendant, as well as prior violent 
criminal acts committed by him (R. 344:459-60; State's Exh. 9; Add. F). The State also 
argued that it "had the right to inquire about the basis for [the doctor's] opinion" (R. 
344:460; Add. F). 
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Defendant challenged the State's reference to defendant's illegally carrying a 
concealed weapon as improper because the State had not charged defendant with that 
crime (R. 344:458; Add. F). The State responded that the questions asked Ms. Jiminez 
were "not improper questioning in terms of uncharged criminal conduct" because the 
conduct was "part of this criminal episode. The fact that it is criminal doesn't mean we 
don't get to inquire about it" (R. 344:460-61; Add. F). Furthermore, the evidence is 
relevant to rebut defendant's claim that the victims were the aggressors in this case (R. 
344:461; Add. F). 
Motion denied. Ruling on the motion, the court agreed that, although there was a 
basis for it, the State's question regarding aliases was improper because it was not 
supported by admissible evidence (R. 344:469; Add. F). However, any prejudicial effect 
of the question "[was] mitigated somewhat by the fact that Mr. Jiminez had admitted on 
direct examination he used an alias and admitted on cross-examination he [had 
previously] lied and [given] his health care provider false information" (R. 344:470; Add. 
F). Thus, "the unfair harm to the defendant's case does not, based on that problem alone, 
require a mistrial" (R. 344:471; Add. F). 
The court then ruled that whether defendant had brought the weapon to the store 
and concealed it "may go to his state of mind" and is thus relevant "in determining 
whether he or the assailants were the aggressors" (R. 344:471; Add. F). Regarding the 
question concerning the illegality of a concealed weapon, "I sustained the objection" and 
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no answer was given (R. 344:471-72; Add. F). Thus, "there wasn't sufficient unfair harm 
to the defendant's case such that a mistrial would be warranted" (R. 344:472; Add. F). 
Finally, regarding the questioning of defendant's medical expert, the court held 
that "[wjhether [defendant] had head injuries from any source that may have had this 
concussive impact was relevant" (R. 344:472; Add. F). Furthermore, defendant's 
objection to the State's reference to defendant's violent behavior had been sustained (R. 
344:472; Add. F). Thus, again, "there's not enough unfair damage to Mr. Jiminez' case 
based on that question to warrant a mistrial" (R. 344:472; Add. F). The court thus denied 
defendant's motion (R. 344:470; Add. F). 
Jury instructions. At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed to ignore all 
evidence to which an objection was sustained and any evidence offered but not admitted 
(R. 238; Instr. 6). "[Y]ou must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or 
as to the reason for the objection" (Id.). 
2. Standard of Review. 
"Because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's 
impact on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial 
motion based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,276 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 
1993). "'Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in 
that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have 
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had a fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of 
discretion.'" Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274-75 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1231 (Utah 1997)). 
3. Under facts of this case, the four challenged 
questions did not significantly call to the 
jury's attention any matter it would not be 
justified in considering in reaching its 
verdict. 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's questions improperly placed before the jury 
evidence of defendant's bad acts and criminal conduct that the jury should not have 
considered in reaching its verdict. See Aplt. Br. at 19. However, defendant does not 
show how any of the questions challenged on appeal necessarily raises an improper 
inference that defendant himself had not already raised. Cf. State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d 
531, 547 (Mo.) (en banc) ("Unless the testimony objected to consists of clear evidence of 
another crime, there is no trial court abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial."), cert 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 431 (1999). 
First, it is pure conjecture whether the jury understood the question regarding the 
illegality of defendant's carrying a concealed weapon as indicating that defendant had a 
criminal past Cf. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, f 19, 8 P.3d 1025 (finding no prosecutorial 
misconduct where "it is extremely unlikely that the jury drew the inference [defendant] 
describes"). Furthermore, in the State's final rebuttal during closing argument, the State 
made clear to the jury that the illegality of defendant's conduct in having the gun was 
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irrelevant (R. 345:694). Thus, the State essentially argued that this was not a matter 
which the jury would be justified in considering in reaching its verdict. See Kohl, 2000 
UT 35 at U17; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53; Basta, 966 P.2d at 268.3 
Second, "[t]he use of an alias does not constitute clear evidence associating 
defendant with other crimes." Brown, 998 S.W.2d at 547. Thus, the State's reference 
alone would not have necessarily placed such evidence before the jury. See Brown, 998 
S.W.2d at 547. Moreover, defendant's use of aliases had already been put before the jury 
by his own testimony on direct that he had used an alias in 1994 to obtain free medical 
services (R. 343:366). Thus, the State's question placed no issue before the jury that 
defendant had not already raised. Cf. People v. Huynh, 626 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (App. Div. 
1995) (memorandum decision) (concluding that prosecutor could inquire further into 
aliases after defendant had opened the door and placed his credibility in issue by 
testifying that he used aliases because of confusion about his real name); Chase v. State, 
541 P.2d 867, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (holding that defendant opened door to 
3As the trial court noted in denying defendant's motion for mistrial after closing 
argument, the State revisited the issue of whether defendant could legally possess a 
weapon only in rebuttal to defendant's claim, in his closing argument, that he had such a 
right under the second amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 345:708-10). See 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,426 (Utah 1973) (concluding no prosecutorial misconduct 
where prosecutor's remarks were "in direct reply to the theory advanced by defense 
counsel in his final argument"); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,925 (Utah App. 1990) 
(holding that prosecutor does not commit misconduct in responding to argument 
defendant addressed in his closing). 
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prosecution questions concerning aliases by implying on direct examination that alias 
disclosed was only alias ever used). 
Third, the question to the expert concerning "any other history of violence that 
[defendant] has had" could just as easily have been understood to ask to whether 
defendant had been a victim of any additional violence as whether he had been a 
perpetrator. In fact, the expert's response to the State's reworded question made clear 
that the relevant issue was whether defendant had experienced additional head trauma in 
the past under any circumstances (R. 344:404). 
Finally, there is no evidence that Ms. Jiminez had asserted her right against self-
incrimination. However, even assuming arguendo that it was error to ask Ms. Jiminez 
whether she helped defendant conceal himself because the answer may have incriminated 
her, the issue of defendant's concealment itself was properly before the jury as evidence 
of defendant's consciousness of guilt. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |23 & n.6, 10 
P.3d 346 (noting that evidence of flight is admissible as probative of consciousness of 
guilt); State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987) (same); Eliott v. State, 27 S.W.3d 
432 (Ark. 2000) ("When evidence of a prior crime reflects a consciousness of guilt, it is 
independently relevant and admissible under Rule 4040(b)."); Davis v. State, 722 So. 2d 
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143, 145 f 6 (Miss. 1998) (same); State v. Berosik, 988 P.2d 775, 780 f27 (Mont. 1999) 
(same); United States v. Robinson, 161 F.3d463, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).4 
Thus, none of the four questions challenged on appeal sufficiently called to the 
jury's attention matters which it would not be justified in considering in reaching its 
verdict as to constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
4. None of the allegedly improper questions 
were so substantial and prejudicial that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the 
questions, defendant would have been 
acquitted 
Defendant asserts that the State's questions "presented the jury with an opportunity 
to assume that Jimenez was a bad person and was probably guilty of the crimes at issue 
because he was violent or had committed other crimes, or that Jimenez had something to 
hide about his past." Aplt. Br. at 21-22. He then claims that he was prejudiced by the 
questions because they "may have added critical weight to the prosecutor's case" in a case 
that "came down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses" 
where the evidence presented by defendant "would have absolved Jimenez of the crimes." 
Aplt. Br. at 22, 25-26. However, defendant's claim fails where the prosecutor's questions 
; 4Despite defendant's suggestion on appeal that the trial court sustained defendant's 
objection to questions concerning defendant's concealment as "criminal conduct... that 
had not been charged in this matter," Aplt. Br. at 17-18, in fact, the court only sustained 
the objection to the question concerning his wife's participation in the concealment (R. 
344:454, 477). As defendant's trial counsel acknowledged, defendant's wife could 
properly testify as to what she observed concerning defendant's concealment (R. 344:453 
("If the question is what did she observe, I think that's a proper question.")). 
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were not obviously improper, where they were isolated questions occurring over the 
course of a four-day trial, and where the evidence against defendant was substantial. 
In determining whether a statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, "'the 
statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" State 
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 
848, 852 (Utah App. 1992)). A jury's verdict must be upheld if "a review of the entire 
record does not indicate, absent the improper question, there was a reasonable likelihood 
defendant would have been found not guilty." State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 
(Utah 1977); see also State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787 (Utah App. 1991) (holding 
that question is, "[specifically, would the jury have been more likely to acquit 
[defendant]... on his self-defense claim, if the improper comment had not been made?"). 
Factors relevant to that determination include the frequency with which the 
statements are made, the strength of the State's case, the plausibility of defendant's 
exculpatory explanation, and whether the jury was instructed concerning the statements. 
See. e.g., Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274; State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 
345 (Utah App. 1993). 
The questions, even if improper, were isolated. Here, defendant challenges four 
different questions asked on the second and third day of a four-day trial in which fourteen 
witnesses were called. 
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One of the questions challenged, and the only one to which the State actually 
received an answer, was relevant to determine the extent of the expert's knowledge of 
defendant and the basis of the expert's opinion. See, e.g., Storey v. State, 552 N.E.2d 
477, 482 (Ind. 1990) (holding State may "attempt[] to refute the opinion of the 
defendant's [medical expert] by attacking the information upon which it was based"); 
State v. Thompson, 985 S.W.2d 779, 786-87 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). 
The other three questions were never even answered; rather, in those instances, the 
jury heard defendant object, observed counsel and the court in an off-the-record side-bar, 
and then saw the State drop its prior question and move on to a new subject (R. 343:369 
(question concerning use of alias; no indication on the record that objection sustained); 
344:444-45 (question concerning defendant's illegal possession of concealed weapon; 
objection sustained on the record); R. 344:477 (question concerning wife's assisting to 
conceal defendant; objection sustained on the record)). 
Moreover, the State made no further reference to the subject matter of any of the 
four questions during the remainder of the trial, except briefly in response to defendant's 
closing argument. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274 (holding no prejudice where single 
statement, made in the course of a long trial, was not relied upon or referred to again by 
the prosecutor); State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997) (holding frequency of 
comment is relevant in determining prejudice); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (same). 
This is not a case, then, in which the State made repeated attempts to inflame or 
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place improper evidence before the jury. Thus, the cases relied upon by defendant are 
distinguishable. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992) (finding 
misconduct where prosecutor made repeated attempts to have defendant admit he had 
rehearsed testimony with counsel); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (finding 
misconduct where prosecutor made repeated references to defendant's use of aliases and 
prior bad acts); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (finding misconduct where prosecutor's 
comments not isolated); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 345 (finding misconduct where prosecutor's 
improper statements were pervasive); State v. Bain, 575 P.2d 919, 922 (Mont. 1978) 
(finding misconduct where prosecutor has made repeated attempts to offer evidence 
previously ruled inadmissible); 
"It is conceivable that under some circumstances the asking of improper questions 
might by suggestion or innuendo have the effect the defendant contends. Yet if our rules 
were based on such an assumption, there would be little need or incentive for the trial 
court to rule correctly on objections." State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 
1324 (Utah 1974). Thus, prejudice is rarely established where, uas the record stands, 
there is nothing but an improper question which remains wholly unanswered." Requa v. 
Daly-Judge Mining Co., 46 Utah 92,148 P. 448,451 (Utah 1915). Cf. Harmon, 956 P.2d 
at 274; Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297. 
Evidence against defendant was substantial and corroborated. Furthermore, 
despite defendant's claim otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 25-26, this case did not come down 
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to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses. 
The State's evidence was substantial. It established that Rios and his friends were 
unarmed when they stopped at the 7-Eleven on October 20 to let Rios use the restroom. 
Defendant pulled in shortly thereafter, retrieved his gun from under his seat, and 
confronted Miera and Montoya, who were still in the car. Although much smaller than 
either Rios or Montoya, defendant did not retreat from them but, rather, reached for his 
gun. In response, Rios punched defendant in the face and immediately turned and ran. 
Montoya followed. Defendant began shooting at them while he was still on the ground. 
Once back standing, he fired two shots into Miera's chest and then resumed shooting at 
Rios and Montoya. He fired seven shots in all before calling his wife and leaving the 
scene. He then hid his car in a friend's garage, admitted to friends that he had killed 
someone, and fled the State. 
Although the majority of this evidence came from two eye-witnesses, Rios and 
Montoya, their testimony was corroborated not only by the video taken by the 7-Eleven 
surveillance camera and the State's other witnesses, but also by two defense witnesses, 
John Moyes and Ron Edwards, as well as defendant himself. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 
274; Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297; Palmer, 860 P.2d at 345 (all 
noting that prejudice more likely where case depends primarily on resolution of 
conflicting evidence consisting of uncorroborated testimony). 
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Defendant's exculpatory explanations were weak. Defendant's defense at trial 
was a mix of self-defense and a sort of momentary lack of control due to prior head 
trauma suffered in 1994. Neither of these defenses was strong. 
First, defendant immediately raised questions concerning his credibility when he 
began his defense by admitting that he had previously used an alias and lied to medical 
providers to get out of paying for — i.e., to steal—medical services. 
Second, defendant testified that he carried a gun because he was afraid and wanted 
to protect himself and his wife (R. 344:568, 570). This testimony was incredible for 
several reasons. Defendant did not carry a gun after he was allegedly viciously attacked 
in 1994 (R. 344:568). Furthermore, he could not explain the source of his fear in 1996 
(R. 344:568). Finally, defendant fled the State after the shooting, leaving his wife 
essentially unprotected (R. 344:478, 590-91). 
Third, defendant claimed that he did not initiate the confrontation with Rios and 
his friends (R. 344:560-62). However, he also testified that he specifically put the gun 
into his pants when he arrived at the 7-Eleven; and that he went over to the white car 
because he heard murmurs and, although he could not understand what was being said, he 
knew that he was being insulted (R. 344:560-61, 570-71). 
Fourth, defendant claimed that he only pulled his gun and started shooting after 
having seen Miera with a gun (R. 344:563). However, Rios testified that he and his 
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friends were unarmed that night and Detective Mark R. Chidester testified that no gun 
was found at the scene (R. 343:219, 233, 309-10, 315; R. 344:563).5 
Fifth, defendant claimed that he shot at Miera and the others only because he 
wanted them to leave him alone (R. 344:440, 565). However, defendant fired seven shots 
that night at people who were unarmed (R. 343:308-09, 313, 343). Furthermore, Rios and 
Montoya were running away from defendant when he shot at them, and defendant 
returned to the driver's side of the white car in order to shoot Miera point blank when 
Miera had never even threatened him (R. 343:235-38; R. 344:438, 548). Cf. Harrison, 
805 P.2d at 787 (holding that rejection of defendant's claim of self-defense did not 
indicate prejudice where jury "had ample reason to reject the assertion that [the victim] 
had been armed, quite apart from any impact the prosecutor's comment may have had"). 
Finally, in support of his "temporary loss of control" defense, defendant's own 
medical expert testified that, despite any head trauma suffered in the past, defendant 
would nonetheless have understood that night that he was shooting at people and that he 
could possibly kill them (R. 344:411,413). According to the expert, Defendant just 
wouldn't know whether he was shooting out of revenge, defense, or anger (R. 344:424). 
5Defendant claims the reason for this was because the police officers' investigation 
was deficient. See Aplt. Br. at 25. However, defendant called two witnesses on this 
issue. One testified that the scene would have been substantially contaminated by the 
presence of a medical helicopter and personnel attempting to save Miera's life, that 
saving his life took precedence over preservation of the crime scene, and that the officer's 
recovery of five out of seven projectiles and seven out of seven casings was "pretty good" 
under the circumstances and would constitute "a good search" (R:344:541-45, 552). 
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Jury instructions mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the jury was 
instructed to ignore all evidence to which an objection was sustained and all evidence 
offered but not admitted (R. 238: Instr. 6). See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 24, 999 P.2d 
7 (holding that defendant must show comment was so prejudicial "as to defeat the 
mitigating effect of the court's . . . curative instructions"). Defendant concedes that he 
did not always ensure that the trial court's rulings on objections were on the record. See 
Aplt. Br. at 27. However, as to the three questions to which objections were sustained 
(whether immediately or subsequently), the jury heard defendant object, observed counsel 
and the court in an off-the-record side-bar, and then saw the State drop its prior question 
and move on to a new subject (R. 343:369 (question concerning use of alias; no indication 
on the record that objection sustained); 344:444-45 (question concerning defendant's 
illegal possession of concealed weapon; objection sustained on the record); R. 344:477 
(question concerning wife's assisting to conceal defendant; objection sustained on the 
record)). It is reasonable to assume that the jury understood, based on how defendant's 
objections were handled, that the court had in fact sustained them. The jury's verdicts, 
acquitting defendant of the greater offenses of murder and attempted murder and finding 
him guilty only of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter, indicate that it heeded that 
instruction. Cf. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988) (holding "fact that the 
jury acquitted defendant of two of the four charges indicates that the verdict was a result 
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of a reasoned application of the law, rather than prejudice engendered by the improper 
evidence."). 
Conclusion. To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, "the 'mere 
possibility' of a different outcome occurring without the [misconduct] is not enough; 
instead, cthe likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f26, 974 P.2d 269. Here, "a 
review of the entire record does not indicate, absent the [allegedly] improper questions], 
there is a reasonable likelihood defendant would have been found not guilty." Peterson, 
560 P.2d at 1390; see also Harrison, 805 P.2d at 787. 
II. BECAUSE THE STATE COULD PROPERLY COMPARE 
DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR AT TRIAL TO 
HIS APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR AT THE TIME OF THE 
SHOOTING, THE STATE'S COMPARISON IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT WAS NOT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Defendant claims that, during closing argument, the State violated defendant's 
right to be tried in the "garb of innocence" by comparing his appearance at trial in a suit 
and tie with Rios's appearance in prison clothes and shackles. See Aplt. Br. at 29. 
However, because the State made no such comparison, but, rather, properly addressed 
defendant's credibility in light of the evidence presented, the State's comments did not 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Prior to the parties' closing arguments, the court verbally instructed the jury that 
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"nothing the attorneys say in argument is evidence" (R. 345:637, 639). The court also 
issued a written instruction providing that the jury "should not consider as evidence any 
statement of counsel made during the trial, unless such statement was made as a 
stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts" (R. 250; Instr. 18). 
The State's closing argument consists of 26 pages of trial transcript (R. 345:642-
667). In approximately the middle of the argument, the State commented that "[t]here are 
reasons to believe and not to believe witnesses" (R. 345:656; Addendum G). The State 
then commented on "the credibility of the Jiminezes," noting, for example, their 
"extremely selective memory" (R. 345:657; Add. G). The State continued: 
He can't remember shooting. He can't remember 
aiming. He can't remember clearing the jam. He can't 
remember loading the gun. He can't remember the recoil. He 
can't remember those things that are important to him. 
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and 
his credibility as to the events, you have had a chance to 
see not only the defendant in this courtroom today and 
this week with how he presents himself, with how he 
packages himself in appearance and dress and haircut and 
glasses and demeanor, in temper or lack thereof, you have 
seen him in every one of those aspects on [the 7-Eleven 
surveillance tape recorded] October 20th, 1996. Is this an 
honest packaging? 
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios should 
be in chains. But Manny Rios isn't anything except what 
Manny Rios is. But you have—and I recall—I want you to 
recall Mr. Shapiro's opening statement, and he was 
talking about the news—the couple, not newly married 
couple, but the couple, they had gotten their child a baby-
sitter and they were able to go out for this date* Just your 
average couple. And on the other hand we had the 
drunken rowdy trouble making boxers cruising for 
28 
trouble. Is either one of those portrayals [of the actors on 
the night of the crime] honest now that you know the 
situation? Or is it part of the packaging? 
(R. 345:659-60; Add. G) (emphasis added). No further reference was made to Rios 
during this part of the State's argument. However, later in the same argument, the State 
reminded the jury: "You got to view the deportment of both the defendant and his wife on 
the stand" (R. 345:664; Add. G). It then asked the jury to "[w]atch the tape" and 
"[rjealize the packaging today as it is today and as it was then" (R. 345:666; Add. G). 
Defendant did not object to any of the foregoing statements made during the 
State's initial closing argument. However, defendant did object several times during the 
State's rebuttal, (R. 345:688, 692, 696), and the jury was reminded "that nothing the 
attorneys say is evidence," (R. 345:689). Defendant does not challenge any of the 
rebuttal statements on appeal. 
After the jury was excused to deliberate, defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming, 
inter alia, that the State had improperly compared Rios's appearance in court to that of 
defendant's (R. 345:701; Addendum H). The State argued that the State's comments did 
not compare defendant's appearance and deportment to that of Rios, but rather compared 
defendant's appearance and deportment at the time of trial to his appearance and 
deportment at the time of the crime; and defendant's portrayal of both himself and Rios at 
the time of the crime with the actual evidence of their appearance at the time of the crime. 
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(R. 345:702-03; Add. H). Such comment, argued the State, was proper where defendant 
took the stand and placed his credibility in issue (R. 345:702; Add. H). 
In denying defendant's motion for mistrial, the court noted that, "in opening 
arguments and during Mr. Jiminez' own testimony, the defendant attempted to present to 
the jury an appearance or an image of what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention 
was" (R. 345:709; Add. H). "It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to make an effort to 
contradict that image" (Id.). 
B. Standard of Review 
As discussed above, to establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must 
demonstrate both that the prosecutor called to the jury's attention a matter it would not be 
justified in considering in reaching its verdict, and that, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, the prosecutor's comments were so substantial and prejudicial that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that, absent the comments, the result of the trial would have been 
more favorable to defendant. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at f 17; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-
53; Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. "4[T]he [challenged] statements or conduct must be viewed in 
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected 
the fairness of the trial.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah App.) (quoting State v. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475,480 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). 
However, where, as here, the trial court has already ruled on defendant's claim, 
this Court will not reverse that decision "absent an abuse of discretion." Harmon, 956 
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P.2d at 276; see also Hay, 859 P.2d at 6. An abuse of discretion exists only if "a review 
of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely 
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 274-75 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231). 
C Because the State may properly comment on the 
credibility of a defendant who has testified on his own 
behalf and because the State's comments on defendant's 
appearance and deportment were based on the evidence 
and were offered to rebut defendant's claim that he was 
an innocent victim guilty only of self-defense, the State's 
comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
Defendant asserts that the State's comments on defendant's appearance and 
demeanor improperly referred to defendant's right to appear at trial in the "garb of 
innocence" by comparing defendant's appearance at trial in a suit with Rios's appearance 
at trial in prison clothes. Aplt. Br. at 30 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 
(Utah App. 1991)). However, the challenged statements, considered both in isolation and 
context, do not support defendant's claim. 
Numerous courts have held that, once a defendant testifies at his trial, "[i]t is fair 
comment for the State to point out the difference in defendant's appearance at the time of 
the incident and at the time of trial" People v. Porrata, 613 N.E.2d 1212,1221 (111. App. 
1993); see also Robertson v. State, 319 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1974) ("It is proper to show 
Defendant had changed his appearance since the alleged crime."); cf. Commonwealth v. 
Frazier, 480 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super 1984) (concluding that reference to defendant as 
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"dressed like he's out of Gentlemen's Quarterly" was not improper and, even if improper, 
was not prejudicial). 
This principle is a natural extension of the rule generally accepted in Utah that 
"
c[i]f [a defendant] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense[,] his credibility may 
be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness.'" State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (brackets in original) (quoting Brown v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958)); see also State v. Hansen, 22 Utah 2d 63, 
448 P.2d 720, 721 (Utah 1968). Thus, the State may introduce and comment on "any 
testimony or evidence 'which would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt upon the 
credibility of [a defendant's] testimony.'" State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479,482 (Utah App. 
1991) (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978)). 
Finally, "Utah law affords trial attorneys considerable latitude in closing 
arguments." Cummins, 839 P.2d at 852. "Counsel for both sides have a 'right to discuss 
fully from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom.'" Id. at 842-43 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)). 
They also have the right, "during closing arguments, [to] comment on the credibility of 
witnesses." Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 (quoting Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15). 
In light of these legal principles, the statements that defendant challenges on 
appeal do not constitute improper comment on defendant's right to appear at trial in a 
"garb of innocence." 
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The State's first comment was: 
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and his 
credibility as to the events, you have had a chance to see not 
only the defendant in this courtroom today and this week with 
how he presents himself, with how he packages himself in 
appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor, 
in temper or lack thereof, you have seen him in every one of 
those aspects on [the 7-Eleven surveillance tape recorded] 
October 20th, 1996. Is this an honest packaging? 
(R. 345:659; Add. G). Clearly, the purpose of this statement was not to ask the jury to 
draw certain inferences concerning defendant's credibility based on his "garb of 
innocense," but to contrast defendant's appearance and demeanor at the time of the 
shooting with his appearance and demeanor at the time of trial. As the State reiterated 
later in its argument, "Realize the packaging today as it is today and as it was then" (R. 
345:666; Add. G). 
"The prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in 
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a 
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." State v. Chess, 617 P.2d 
341, 344 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f4; 999 P.2d 1. Thus, a 
criminal defendant has the "right.. . to be tried in front of a jury in the 'garb of 
innocense,' rather than in prison clothing." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah 
App. 1991). However, this does not mean that the State must provide defendant with an 
"expensive wardrobe." Chess, 617 P.2d at 345. Rather, it means only that, unless 
defendant specifically chooses otherwise, defendant has a right to appear in "civilian 
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clothing," Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at %L\,—"clean, respectable clothes, not identifiable as 
peculiarly prison clothes." Chess, 617 P.2d 345. 
Defendant's right to appear in the "garb of innocence," then, is not a right to 
appear at trial in a suit and tie. See Chess, 617 P.2d at 345. Rather, defendant only has a 
right in civilian clothes. Id. He thus could have appeared at trial in clothing similar to 
what he was wearing on October 20, 1996. He chose not to, opting instead to "clean up" 
his appearance. 
Because defendant testified at his trial, the State could properly comment on this 
change. See Porrata, 613 N.E.2d at 1221; Robertson, 319.N.E.2d at 836; Frazier, 480 
A.2d at 280. The State's comment in no way detracted from defendant's right to appear 
at trial in the "garb of innocence." It did not, as defendant suggests, imply that defendant 
was incredible because he was not wearing prison clothing. Rather, it only suggested 
what the jury could reasonably infer concerning defendant's credibility based on his 
changed image. See Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green, 578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448 
P.2d at 721; Baker, 963 P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at 
482. The State "[has] the right to discuss 'fully from [its] standpoint] the evidence and 
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'" See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 842-43 
(citation omitted). 
The State's second statement was also proper. 
But you have —and I recall—I want you to recall Mr. 
Shapiro's opening statement, and he was talking about the 
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newly—the couple, not newly married couple, but the couple, 
they had gotten their child a baby-sitter and they were able to 
go out for this date. Just your average couple. And on the 
other hand we had the drunken rowdy trouble making boxers 
cruising for trouble. 
(R. 445:659-660; Add. G). Here, the State asked the jury to consider whether defendant's 
and Rios's appearances at the time of the shooting supported defendant's portrayal at trial 
of himself and Rios at the time of the shooting—that he was an innocent victim and Rios, 
a drunken trouble-maker. "Is either one of those portrayals honest now that you know the 
situation? Or is it part of the packaging?" (R. 445:660; Add. G). 
Again, nothing in the State's comment suggests that defendant should have worn 
prison clothing during the trial or that he was incredible because he did not. Indeed, the 
comment did not even refer to defendant's appearance at trial. Rather the comment only 
asked the jury to consider whether defendant's appearance on the 7-Eleven surveillance 
tape was consistent with his claim that he was an innocent victim acting in self-defense, 
and whether Rios's appearance on the tape was consistent with defendant's claim that 
Rios was a drunk and rowdy trouble-maker. The State was thus only discussing from its 
standpoint the evidence and inferences concerning the witnesses' credibility arising 
therefrom. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 842-43; see also Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green, 
578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448 P.2d at 721; Baker, 963 P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at 
854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at 482.. 
Although the State did comment on Rios's appearance in chains in between the 
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two comments discussed above (R. 345:659-60; Add. G), the Rios comment did not raise 
the inference, as defendant claims, that defendant should have also appeared in chains. 
Rather, the State's comment merely asserted that Rios's appearance in chains was 
consistent with the violent criminal history he himself had testified to at trial (R. 345:656-
57). To the extent that statement related at all to the other two, it did not suggest a 
comparison of Rios's appearance at trial with defendant's appearance at trial; rather, it 
suggested only that Rios's appearance was consistent with his testimony and that 
defendant's was not. There was nothing improper about this or the other comments. See 
Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green, 578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448 P.2d at 721; Baker, 963 
P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at 482. 
The larger context in which the statements were made confirms this conclusion. 
See Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 (holding that appellate court must consider statement in 
context). The State opened this section of its argument with the statement that "[t]here are 
reasons to believe and not to believe witnesses" (R. 345:656; Add. G). The State first 
discussed the evidence relative to Rios's credibility (R. 345:656-57; Add. G). It then 
moved on to discuss the credibility of the Jiminezes (R. 345:657; Add. G). It began with 
their "extremely selective memory" (Id.). It next moved to issues concerning defendant's 
appearance, including the comments challenged here (R. R. 345:659-60; Add. G). It then 
discussed the testimony of defendant's medical expert and whether that testimony was 
consistent with Rios's testimony or the 7-Eleven video of the crime (R. 345:660-62; Add. 
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G). In conclusion, the State asked the jury "to view the deportment of both the defendant 
and his wife on the stand," (R. 345:664; Add. G), and to "[r]ealize the packaging today as 
it is today and as it was then," (R. 345:666; Add. G). 
The State's comments on defendant's credibility span eleven (11) pages of 
transcript (Add. G). The only reference to Rios in chains is that upon which defendant 
rests his misconduct claim. Neither alone or in context did that reference call on the jury 
to compare Rios's appearance in chains with defendant's appearance in a suit. 
Defendant's assertion, then, that the State called to the jurors' attention a matter which it 
would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict, fails. 
Moreover, even if a juror were able to discern in the prosecutor's statements the 
implication that defendant now sees there, defendant has not shown that the effect of the 
comment was so substantial and prejudicial as to require a new trial. First, although 
defendant's trial counsel immediately objected to several comments during the State's 
rebuttal argument (R. 345:688, 692, 696), it did not do so to the Rios comment (R. 
345:659-60). Thus, trial counsel did not initially find the phrase objectionable or 
understand the comment to be anything other than fair comment on witnesses' credibility. 
Second, it is extremely unlikely that the jury would have understood the comment as 
asking it to compare Rios's appearance in chains with defendant's appearance in a suit. 
See, e.g., Reed, 2000 UT 68 at f l9 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where "it is 
extremely unlikely that the jury drew the inference [defendant] describes"). 
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Third, the comment was the only one like it in 26 pages of closing argument. See 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274 (Utah 1998) (holding no prejudice where single statement, 
made in the course of a long trial, was not relied upon or referred to again by the 
prosecutor); Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536 ((holding that frequency of comment is relevant in 
determining prejudice); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (same). Finally, as discussed above, 
see pp. 23-22 supra, the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts in this case was 
substantial. Cf. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988) (holding "fact that the 
jury acquitted defendant of two of the four charges indicates that the verdict was a result 
of a reasoned application of the law, rather than prejudice engendered by the improper 
evidence."). 
Thus, under the circumstances of this particular case, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that, absent the challenged comment, the jury would have found in favor of 
defendant. Cf. Wright, 893 P.2d at 1119 (rejecting claim that prosecutor's statement that 
"'the performance that you saw from the defendant on the witness stand was utterly 
incredible'" was prejudicial "in light of the totality of the evidence"). 
III. THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE 
BECAUSE THERE WERE NOT NUMEROUS ERRORS AND ANY 
ERRORS COMMITTED WERE SO MINOR AS TO NOT HAVE 
INFLUENCED THE OUTCOME 
Defendant next claims that there were so many errors in his trial that even if no 
single error undermined confidence in the verdict, their cumulative effect was sufficient 
to do so. Br. Aplt. at 33. The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal "only if the 
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cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997), affirmed by 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). 
Although defendant has alleged several errors, as explained above, he has not 
established that any substantial errors were committed that could collectively result in any 
harm to him. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). Defendant asserts 
that any errors were likely to affect the outcome because the State's case against him was 
weak. Br. Aplt. 33. However, as discussed above, the State's case against defendant was 
sufficiently strong that, even if none of the alleged errors^had occurred, the jury would 
have convicted him. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED (f_ November 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIlJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 MR. FINLAYSON: There is gruesome 
2I photographs. It's my understanding that the State is 
3 not planning on --
4 MR. LEMCKE: We'll be submitting the drawings 
5 of the medical examiner, Your Honor, only. The only 
6 1 reason we would ever bring in photographs is if 
7 counsel announces that he is going to bring in a 
8I ballistics expert. If he is going to try to say it 
9 1 was not Mr. Jimenez but the stranger on the grassy 
10 knoll and the photographs are somehow necessary to 
111 prove that, we might use them. But I think that is so 
12 remote --
13I MR. FINLAYSONs And we are not planning on 
14 doing that. 
15 MR. LEMCKEt We are not going to do that. 
16 THE COURT: All right. With that 
17 understanding, I will grant the motion. If anything 
18 unexpected occurs --
19 MR. LEMCKE s Yeah. 
20 THE COURTs It would have to be reviewed at 
21 that time. 
22 MR. FINLAYSONi Right. 
23 THE COURTs I will grant the motion. 
24 What about to suppress the evidence of prior 
25 convictions? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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18 
19 
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21 
22 
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24 
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MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, the prior 
convictions the defendant has -- actually, I don't 
think there are any 
period. 
He has had 
relevant ones that are within the 
some involvement with drug 
dealing. There is one that was a failed to file, an 
aggravated assault w 
resisting arrest. 
THE COURT: 
MR. LEMCKE: 
I see was a driver's 
see how those would 
that, you know, he i 
for being a peaceabl 
ith a knife. He has had a 
No felonies? 
Forged government document which 
license or something. I don't 
come in unless we are going to say 
s going to bring in his character 
e person in the furtherance of a 
self-defense claim which we would then, of course, be 
able to bring in a lot of things in terms of even bad 
acts, not just convi 
THE COURT: 
ctions. 
So far as your case in chief, 
you're willing to submit or stipulate to this motion? 
MR. LEMCKEx 
THS COURT: 
Oh, yeah. 
Is that satisfactory? 
MR. FINLAYSON: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FINLAYSON: And the only other motion 
that I see right now coming up is that I talked to 
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there's fertile enough ground without worrying about 
that one, as 
def 
to 
a p 
Mr. 
one 
I 'm 
or 
obj 
MR. 
it turns out. 
LEMCKB: We would ask though that the i 
endant personally waive any objection he may have 
this particular fact. Because that, you know, is 
ersonal right to him. 
THB 
Jlmlnez, 
of 
not 
from 
ectl 
agreed 
put 
was 
to 
on 
the 
the 
motions 
COURT: Okay. Well, I guess, 
the -- your attorney once represented 
the State's witnesses in a criminal case. 
sure 
your 
on if 
MR. 
THB 
MR. 
THB 
if that poses much of a conflict to you 
interests. But do you have any 
Mr. Shapiro continues as your attorney? 
JIMINBZ* I don't. 
COURT: Okay. 
JIMINKZ: Yeah, it's okay. 
COURT: Apparently Mr. Jiminez has 
then and there will be no problem. 
Then there were other motions we needed to 
the record? 
MR. LEMCKB: Yes, your Honor. Before there 
change of judge from Judge Noel to you due 
structural constraints of the court --
THB 
MR. 
that 
COURT: Right. 
LEMCKB: -- there were a number of 
were put before Judge Noel and ruled 
168 
upon by him. 
motion, that 
you in writt< 
rule as Judg< 
the record. 
MR. 
And it 
each of 
an form < 
a Noel hi 
would be our, I believe joint 
those has now been put before 
and that you would essentially 
sis, nunc pro tunc, to preserve 
FINLAY30N: That's correct, your Honor, 
and I think we filed 
those record! 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
3. 
COURT: 
a written motion to review 
The motion was filed yesterday. 
FINLAYSON: Those motions. 
COURT: One was a motion in limine to 
allow statements of an unavailable witness. As I 
understand, Judge Noel sustained or granted the 
objection to that -- to the testimony of those 
unavailable witnesses; is that correct? 
MR. 
stipulation 1 
LEMCKB: 
that the 
He did. And then we agreed by 
entirety of a videotape could 
be played, but not an edited version. 
THE 
Judge Noel's 
COURT: So I won't change or alter 
ruling in any way. I will rule that 
those -- that tape ii 
understand the State 
in any event 
MR. 
THE 
so long 
LEMCKE: 
COURT: 
i inadmissible* However, I 
will agree to its admissibility 
as the entire tape is played. 
That is correct, your Honor. 
And then there was a motion in 
1 
limine to exclude gang references. Is that a motion 
to exclude gang references as to all witnesses, both 
State and defense? 
MR. LEMCKE: We would hope so. 
MR. FINLAY30N: Yes, your Honor, unless 
some witness puts that at issue. 
THE COURT: But at this point Judge Noel 
granted a motion in limine to exclude all gang 
reverences? 
MR. FINLAY30N: All gang references. There 
is -- we do have some information on Mr. Rios. We 
asked him at the preliminary hearing whether he was 
ever involved in gangs, he said no. We do have some 
information that he was involved in gangs. So that 
would actually go to credibility, that being an 
issue there. 
MR. LEMCKE: Well, it's still a gang 
reference, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I didn't hear the motion, 
but -- who brought the motion in limine? 
MR. FINLAYSON: We brought the motion in 
limine because the State had some photographs of 
Mr. Jimines and had some information that he may 
have been involved in gangs in California. So we 
brought the motion in limine to -- so that no gang 
reference --
our client. 
it actually was brought on behalf of 
At the preliminary everybody said, all 
the witnesses said they had no gang involvement. 
And in Mr. Rios1 statements to corrections people he 
indicated that he was involved in a gang. So that j 
is a --
THE COURT: Well, I'll rule the same as 
Judge Noel did. And that would be to exclude all 
gang references at this point. I suppose -- I mean, 
that was his 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
any way. 
ruling, as I understand it? 
LEMCKB: It was, your Honor. 
FINLAYSON: That was his ruling. 
COURT: Okay, I won't change that in 
Then there was a third motion in limine, I 
suppose a defense motion to exclude gruesome 
paragraphs* 
MR. 
THE 
Judge Noel. 
MR. 
THE 
LEMCKB: And we have none to show. 
COURT: And that motion was granted by 
FINLAYSON: It was, Your Honor. 
COURT: Are there any photos that the 
defense is aware of that you would characterize as 
gruesome that you think the State is going to --
MR. FINLAYSON: I don't think any autopsy 
1 
1 photos are coming in. Those are what we were 
2 concerned with. You know, some of the photos have 
3 blood on the street and that's -- we just can't get 
4 around that. So we're not objecting to those. 
5 THE COURT: Those are not gruesome photos 
6 for purposes of that proceeding? 
7 MR. FINLAYSON: I don't think they qualify 
8 I as gruesome photos. 
9 THE COURT: And apparently one of the 
10 parties brought a motion to suppress prior 
111 convictions* 
12 I MR. FINLAYSON: We brought that motion in 
13 limine that there shouldn't be any 609 evidence out 
14 I there on our client. And I think that was 
15 stipulated to as well. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. And Judge Noel granted 
17 that motion? 
18I MR. FINLAY3ON: Granted that. 
19 THE COURT: Suppress evidence of prior 
20 convictions as far as Mr. Jiminez is concerned? 
21 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, I'll rule the same as 
23 Judge Noel. I'll grant the motion in limine to 
24 prohibit the use of a videotape of an interview of 
25 Mr. Rios. Is --
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1 MR. LEMCKE: Mr. Montoya, 
2 THE COURT: Or Montoya then. Except so far 
3 as the State Intends to stipulate to Its 
4 1 admissibility. I'll grant as well Judge Noel's 
5 1 ruling or confirm Judge Noel's ruling on a motion in 
6 1 limine to exclude all gang references. 
7 I I'll rule the same as he did on the 
8 defendant's motion in limine to exclude gruesome 
9 1 photographs* And note the conclusion of the Court 
10 that that does not preclude the use of crime scene 
111 photographs that may show some blood. 
12 I And I'll rule as Judge Noel did on the 
13 motion in limine to suppress evidence of 
14 1 Mr. Jiminei' prior convictions* 
15 Okay, anything else? 
16 1 MR. LEMCKE: Yes, your Honor. The State 
17 has a motion at this time based on the opening 
18 statement of Mr* Shapiro, and as you'll recall 
19 Mr. Shapiro proffered to the jury in the opening 
20 statement that what the defendant did in this case 
21 in killing Mr* Miera and shooting at Mr. Montoya and 
22I Mr. Rios went beyond self-defense. It went beyond 
23 defense of others* It went to, in fact, the safety 
24 of wife and children* It went to the defense of the 
25 family and it is what any man would do. And we feel 
that this has called the defendant's character into 
issue in this case. 
THE COURT: And you --
MR. LEMCKE: And if, in fact, this is going 
to come back with a closing argument that a man, you 
know, kind of the John Wayne, Jimmy Stewart, a man 
must do what a man must do to protect the women and 
children, that these are character issues, and from 
that point if these are raised we are entitled to 
examine the defendant's character in full. 
THE COURT: Now, qualify --or explain a 
little better the second part of what you just said. 
If they are raised, you said something --
MR. LEMCKE: Well, actually, we believe it 
has been raised already by -- brought into issue in 
this. Although it wouldn't go in the case in chief, 
nonetheless were the defendant to testify that, you 
know, this is -- a man has to do this to protect his 
family sort of thing, because clearly you will see 
from the videotape and other things that the 
defendant was not --or the wife of the defendant 
clearly was not in imminent danger from either the 
person who was being shot or the two people that 
were running away. 
That to go to this as some kind of a 
17 
character thing and he -- what a man must do, 
character on the plate and at that particular 
we're entitled to start examining those issues 
the defendant's character and counter that. 
THE COURT: Let me say this at this p 
because I'm not sure the motion is yet ripe, I 
listen to the testimony of Mr. Jiminez and the 
puts 
point 
and 
oint, 
•11 
other 
defense witnesses and if in my judgment Mr. Jiminez 
has placed his character at issue, testifying 
having someone else testify that he's got a 
reputation in the community for being a piece-
man or by nature he's a peaceable person or 
something like that, clearly the State would b 
entitled to rebut. 
Okay, so I'll take the motion under 
advisement. One other thing I wanted to point 
or 
loving 
e 
out 
and put on the record, last evening, just prior to 
our recess and after the jury was excused, the 
objected to the use of two defense expert witn 
one a doctor -- remind him of his name. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Rothfeder. 
THE COURT: Rothfeder. And a Mr. --
me again. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Moyes. 
THE COURT: Moyes. I would overrule 
State 
esses, 
help 
the 
1 
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1 JOSE MARIO JIMINEZ, 
2 called by the defendant, having been duly 
3I sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
4 
5 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
6 testimony you are about to give in the case now 
7 before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth 
8 and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
10 1 THE CLERK: Be seated up here, please. 
Ill MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, may we approach? 
12 THE COURT: Yes. 
13 1 (Side-bar conference.) 
14 THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
15 (Examination conducted through an 
16 1 interpreter.) 
17 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. FINLAYSONt 
20 Q Okay, Jose, will you tell us your name and 
21 date of birth? 
22 A (In English) Jose Mario Jiminez. 
23 Q When were you born? 
24 A (In English) My date of birth is -- excuse 
2 5 me? 
36 
Q 
A 
Q 
birth 
A 
Q 
When were you born? 
(In English) May 1st, 1973. 
Okay. Now, the State has your date of 
wrong, 
(In 
And 
the judge at 
A 
Q 
1973? 
A 
Q 
about 
Do you 
years 
A 
Q 
A 
(In 
And 
(In 
don't they? 
English) Yes. 
do you remember correcting that with 
the preliminary hearing? 
English) Yes. 
telling the judge that it was May 1st, 
English) Yes. 
Okay. We're just going to talk briefly 
something that happened to you sometime ago. 
i remember an incident that happened a few 
back in California? 
(In English) Yes. 
Where were you living? 
(In 
downtown Loi 
0 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And 
(In 
English) I was living in almost 
Angeles. 
what was your address there? 
English) Dose Tre Avenue. 
Do you remember the --
(In English) 1953 Castralia. 
Caatralia? 
(In English) Castralia, yeah. 
3 
0 Was there an occasion that something 
happened to you in that --at that address in 
California? 
A (In English) Yes. 
Q Or close to that address in California? 
A (In English) Yes. 
Q And what happened? 
A (In English) I got robbed and --
(Through Interpreter) And they hit me. 
Q 
hospital 
A 
Q 
how you 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Honor. 
(In English) They hit me a lot. 
And based on that did you have to go to the 
L? 
(In English) Yes. 
When you went to the hospital, do you know 
-- how you were taken to the hospital? 
(In English) By the ambulance. 
By the ambulance? 
(In English) Yes. 
And did they treat you at the hospital? 
(In English) Yes. 
MR* LEMCKE: Objection, leading, your 
THE COURT: I don't believe it's leading. 
I'll overrule the objection. 
Q (BY MR. FINLAY3ON) Did they treat your 
365 
wounds 
A 
Q 
head, < 
scar £: 
A 
? 
(In English) Yes, they did. 
Now, I noticed you have a scar on your j 
Dkay. It's obvious. What did you get that 
rom? 
(In English) That's a problem. 
(Through the Interpreter) From that 
problem. 
Q 
A 
to the 
0 
And do you know what happened to your head? 
(In English) I just remember they took me 
hospital. 
Okay. When you went to the hospital by 
ambulance, what name did you use? 
A 
Q 
Is it? 
A 
Q 
A 
to pay 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
(In English) Antonio Sanchez. 
Now, Antonio Sanchez isn't your real name, 
(In English) No. 
Why did you use the name Antonio Sanchez? 
(In English) Because I didn't have money 
the bills. 
So you lied to the hospital? 
(In English) Yeah. 
Because you didn't have money? 
(In English) Yes. 
MR. LEMCKB: Objection, leading, your 
36 
Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: I believe that's what he 
said. 
THE COURT: It is. It would have been 
leading, but I'll overrule the objection. He's 
answered the question. 
MR. FINLAYSON: If I could have just one 
moment, your Honor. 
Your Honor, if I could have these marked. 
THE COURT: That will be Defendant's 
Exhibit 11; is that correct? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Defendant's Exhibit 11. 
Q (BY MR. FINLAYSON) Mr. Jiminex, do you 
read English? 
A (In English) Kind of. 
Q Kind of. Okay, I have here what purports 
to be some medical records ~-
A (In English) Okay. 
Q -- sent to our office. Would you indicate 
to us the name on the medical records here. 
A (In English) Antonio Sanchez. 
0 Okay. Now, is that the name that you used 
at the hospital? 
A (In English) Yes. Yes. 
Q Now, it has an admit date, what's the admit 
367 
date on those? 
A (In English) The 8th of 7, 1994. 
Q And an admit time of 11:56 at night. Does 
that sound right? 
A (In English) Yes. 
Q And what's the date of birth? 
A (In English) It's May 1st, '73. 
Q Now, you haven't had a chance to look at 
these medical records, have you? 
A (In English) No. 
0 There's a patient transfer acknowledgment 
on the third page of these records. Do you see 
where it says the patient's signature? 
A (In English) It says Antonio Sanchez. 
0 Okay. Is that your signature? 
A (In English) Yeah. I think so. 
Q And do you remember signing that patient 
transfer acknowledgment? You may have been a little 
dazed, huh? 
A (In English) I don't remember. 
Q And the physician certificate transfer, 
there's another signature there, right? 
A (In English) Yeah. 
Q You had a broken arm? 
A (In English) Yeah, two. 
3 
Q So you had to sign with a broken arm? 
A (In English) Yes. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, that's all the 
questions I have of Mr. Jiminez at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Cross-examination on 
that -- those points? 
MR. LEMCKB: Very briefly, your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEMCKB: 
Q So Mr. Jiminez, you admit you lied to the 
people who were providing you the medical care? 
A (In English) Yes. 
Q And you used the name, what, Carlos 
Sanchez? 
A (In English) Antonio Sanchez. 
0 These aren't the only other false names 
that you've used, are they? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Judge, I'm going to object 
at this point* Can we approach? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
Q (BY MR. LEMCKB) So Mr. Sanchez -- excuse 
me, Jiminez, on this occasion you have not reviewed 
these records that are contained in the exhibit? 
369 
A 
Q 
(In English) No. No, sir. 
And other than the two signatures you 
are yours, you have no way of knowing If these 
In fact 
people 
A 
claim 
are, 
, the records from California from these 
that you lied to about who you were. 
(Through the Interpreter) I remember 
taken to the hospital. 
Q 
know if 
A 
I was 
Okay. But the question is, sir, do you 
these are, in fact, your records? 
(Through the interpreter) From what : 
been shown, yes. 
Q 
i«, in 
A 
Lt's 
What is it that tells you that this bunch 
fact, your records? 
(In English) The name and --
(Thorough the Interpreter) The results and 
the blows that it shows in there. 
0 
A 
Q 
told us 
A 
because-
do you 
Q 
The results that it shows in there? 
Yes. 
So you have reviewed them? I thought 
you had not* 
(In English) Until right now I said t 
I told -- I warn --
(Thorough the Interpreter) I had a -< 
say it, a surgery. 
All right. So if these show surgery, 
you 
bhat 
- how 
they 
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1 might be yours? 
2 A (In English) Yes. 
3 Q You say they robbed you or they beat you. 
4 Who are they? 
5 1 A (In English) Three or four people. I 
6 1 don't know. I didn't know them. 
7 Q So you -- whatever it was you were in an 
8 1 incident, a violet incident with three or four other 
9 people on that occasion? 
10 A (In English) Oh, there was three or four 
111 people who came to me, robbed me. 
12I Q Is there a police report that accompanies 
13 that? 
14 A (In English) Yes. 
15 Q Have you brought that police report with 
16 you? 
17I A (In English) No, sir. I don't know. 
18 Q You don't know? 
19 A (The witness nods in the negative.) 
20 Q Did you tell the police your correct name? 
21 A (In English) I don't remember. 
22 Q Did you ever talk to the police about these 
23 three or four people that you were involved with and 
24 the violet incident? 
25I A (In English) I did. 
Q But you don't know if you told the police 
your correct name? 
A (In English) I don't remember. 
MR. LEMCKE: Nothing further, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FINLAYSON: 
Q Just one thing. What were you hit with in 
this incident, Mr. Jiminez? 
A (Through the Interpreter) With clubs. The 
ones they use to secure automobiles. 
MR. FINLAYSON: All right. That's all I 
have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Lemcke? 
MR. LEMCKE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, then you may step down, 
sir. 
And I assume then we're through with --at 
this point the defense doesn't have its next witness 
available and won't until tomorrow; is that correct? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Tomorrow morning at 9:00, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: So we'll excuse the jury again 
at this point until about, let's say, 9:00 o'clock 
37 
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THE COURT: Good morning. For the record, 
the members of the jury are present and counsel and 
parties are all present, and X assume prepared to go 
forward this morning. 
Is there anything, Counsel, before we ask 
the defendant to call its next witness? 
MR. LBMCKE: Not that the State's aware of, 
your Honor. 
MR. FINLAY3ON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, I'll ask the defense 
then to call its next witness. 
MR. FINLAY30N: Your Honor, we call 
Dr. Robert Rothfeder. 
ROBERT KEITH ROTHFEDER, 
called by the defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in the case now 
3 
during -- and the broken arm, the broken jaw, that 
is the medical records from California, that is not 
medical records out of this particular incident 
where --
A That's correct. 
Q -- where Mr. Jiminez is punched by 
Mr. Rios? 
A Correct. 
MR. LEMCKS: Could I have State's 1, your 
Honor, the videotape? 
Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. LEMCKS) And have you been 
provided any medical records from the defendant or 
from counsel of the '96 incident where Mr. Rios 
punched Mr. Jimines? 
A No, I've not. 
Q So he presented you no place where --
records from a place where he went to be treated? 
A I've not reviewed records from that 
incident, that's correct. 
Q All right* And he is, in fact, your 
patient and these are his attorneys and they would 
have access to those records if they, in fact, 
existed? 
A I would assume that to be the case, yeah. 
4 
Q And you would also assume they would 
provide them to you? 
A I would* 
Q Okay. And you went over a history with the 
defendant, and other than what he told you about the 
violent street incident that he was involved in, or 
in counsel's words, purports to be involved in in 
'94, and the incident that took place in "96, did he 
give you any other history of violence that he has 
had? 
MR. FINLAY3 ON: Judge, can we approach? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
THE WITNESS: I --
THE COURT: Before you answer, Doctor. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Excuse me just a minute. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: 1*11 overrule the objection. 
MR. LEMCKB: All right. 
Q (BY MR. LEMCKE) Did the defendant give 
you any other history of violence that he's been 
involved in? 
A I didn't frame my question to him in those 
terms, in terms of whether he was involved in 
violence. What I did ask was whether he'd had 
40 
significant previous illnesses or injuries. And 
with respect to injuries, I said I'm not really --
I'm not 
bruises 
really talking about, you know, cuts and 
and that type of thing, but serious, what 
he'd consider serious injuries, and childhood or 
adult. 
history 
Q 
was the 
A 
And he did not give me any additional 
of serious trauma. 
So the only history he provided you then 
"94 incident and the '96 incident? 
That was the only positive response to that 
question on previous trauma, correct. 
Q 
such? 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. And you are not a psychologist as 
As such, well --
Or a psychiatrist? 
A lot of what I do involves that, but 
that's not what Z describe myself as, a 
psychologist. 
0 
area of 
A 
Q 
extreme 
A 
Q 
That's not your particular professional 
expertise? 
Correct. 
And you're not here to give an opinion on 
emotional disturbance, are you? 
That's correct. 
And also you're not here to talk about 
40 
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NOEMI MONICA JIMINEZ, 
called by the defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in the case now 
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Be seated up here, please. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Judge. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAPIRO: 
0 Good morning, Ms. Jiminez. Would you for 
the record tell us your full name and spell your 
last name. 
A Noemi Monica Jiminez, J-i-m-i-n-e-z. 
Q Okay. We1re going to ask you to speak up 
so that everybody can hear. That microphone will 
help a little bit, but please speak loud enough so 
that everybody can hear. 
Do you know the defendant? 
43 
in 
had 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
his 
A 
0 
a 
A 
Q 
under 
You 
Yes 
You 
Yes 
Did 
saw Mr. 
• 
saw your 
• 
you see 
clothing earli 
No. 
Did you know 
Rios punch your husband? 
• husband come up with the gun? 
your husband conceal that gun 
er that night? 
when you were at Me Mexico he 
concealed gun on him? 
No. 
Did you know that the concealed weapon 
that circumstance would be a crime in and of 
itself? 
we 
on* 
app 
P« 
think 
MR. 
MR. 
roach? 
MR. 
FINLAYSON: Objection, your Honor. 
SHAPIRO: 
LEMCKE: 
rson do the obj 
THS COURTS 
Objection, your Honor. May 
And your Honor, might we have 
ectlon? 
Yes, just one at a time. I 
we do need to designate one attorney to speak. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THS 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
SHAPIRO: 
COURT: 
LEMCKE: 
The objection la sustained. 
May we approach again, Judge? 
Yes. 
May I be Invited In? 
44 
THE COURT: Yea, go ahead. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection --
or sustain the objection, excuse me. 
Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. SHAPIRO: We'd ask for the instruction 
as well. 
THE COURT: There was no answer, but I'll 
sustain the objection. 
Q (BY MR. LEMCKB) So do you know when he 
concealed that handgun in his clothing? 
A No. 
Q Had you ever seen your husband with a 
concealed handgun before --
A No. 
Q --on other instances? You closed the bar 
Me Mexico? You closed the bar? 
THE COURT: Do you understand the question? 
Q (BY MR. LEMCKM) Were you there at the bar 
until it closed? 
A Yes. 
Q Then you came to the 7-Eleven? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You told us that the man in the car 
was getting out of the car? 
445 
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25 
straightforward with you, which witnesses told you 
the truth. That is why I believe you will find the 
defendant guilty of murder, guilty of attempted 
murder, guilty of a second count of attempted 
murder, and guilty in each of those three counts of 
using a firearm in the commission of those acts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, could we 
approach briefly before? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel for the 
defense, if you'd like to make your closing 
statement. 
MR. FINLAY3ON: Thank you, your Honor. 
Try as I'm sure that you will, because I 
know that you1re going to follow the law, you may 
never be able to put yourself in the shoes of my 
client that night, But that's the law. As judges 
of my client, as judging the facts and bringing back 
a verdict on my client, the law is that -- and all 
the law mentions, the circumstances arising here, 
the law is that you must put yourself in the shoes 
of my client in those same circumstances. 
66 
reasonable people. Anybody who might have 
preconceptions or ideas that are far left, far 
right, those -- we pick people that are not that 
way. We picked people who are going to be fair and 
impartial. You are reasonable people. 
If you have any doubt that the State has 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt that self-defense 
took place, then you have to acquit. And you need 
not consider anything else because that acquits 
Mr. Jiminez of every single count, of Count I, 
homicide; Count II, attempted homicide; and Count 
III, attempted homicide. And that is the law in the 
State of Utah and probably every state. And the 
reason is, is because you cannot be held responsible 
for what happens when the use of dangerous force is 
used when you're trying to defend yourself. 
The State's case, because of that problem, 
the State's case has been, the whole two days, the 
State's case has been that it was improper for my 
client to have a gun. Now, in this country there is 
a second amendment right to have a gun. We have 
rules about that, but there is all kinds of people 
walking around with guns, with concealed weapon 
permits, with concealed weapons. Unfortunately 
whether you agree with guns or you don't agree with 
6 7 1 
1 guns, guns are all over in our society. 
2 And this is not a case about whether it was 
3 proper for Mr. Jiminez to have a gun or not. That 
4 1 is irrelevant. Because whether it was proper for 
5 1 him to have a gun or not when he walked up there, it 
6 1 doesn't matter. What matters is what happened in 
7 those five or six seconds. When he was clocked, 
8I when he was -- went down, when he got up and was 
9 disoriented, confused, not being able to make a 
10 judgment call, he defended himself. And that is 
111 self-defense as Mr. Lemcke admitted. Was it 
12 possible? Yes. Not only possible, but likely. 
13 If you'll indulge me a minute, there's a 
14 couple of things I need to say about jury 
15 instructions. I hate to talk about jury 
16 1 instructions because to tell you truth, it's boring. 
17 But let me say a couple of things. Mr. Lemcke left 
18 out one major part of the self-defense instruction 
19 when he told you what it was. And I think we've 
20 tried to put headings on them so you can find them 
21 easier because I know these jury instructions are 
22 complicated. But self-defense, when you're using 
23 a -- when you're using the type of defense that's 
24 intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
25 injury, you only can use that if he or she 
Mr. Rios, he's been responsible for the 
destruction of at least two lives and who knows how 
many others he's influenced their lives. And I 
would ask you to not allow him to make my client the 
next. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Now let me pause 
for just a minute. Would it be appropriate at this 
point to take another short recess? 
Then Mr. Lemcke, I'll permit you to proceed 
with your rebuttal. 
MR. LEMCKB: Thank you, your Honor. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we get a 
chance to do what's called rebut. Talk about what 
the defense talks about in their closing. 
Goodness sakes, I didn't watch the video 
close enough to know that Manuel Rios shot Henry 
Miera. That Manuel Rios started the whole fight. 
That Manuel Rios did this. It's real easy to have a 
guy like Manny and call him names and everything 
like that. I'm not going to present to you that 
Manny is the guy you would want to date your 
daughter or, you know, to have your sons go out and 
on bar-hopping expeditious with at night. But Manny 
Rios, among other things, you tell me if he's a liar 
or if Manny is just being Manny. I tell you Manny 
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something that would put you in fear for your life, 
but I don't remember that now. j 
He says it's self-defense when defense --
self-defense is clearly not available. He says it's 
extreme emotional distress, but it's not available 
because it's from an act that he caused. He says 
it's imperfect self-defense, but it's not even 
self-defense to start with. 
He wants to lay this off on everyone else. 
He comes in and he says things like, again, 
misquoting Mr. Montoya, well, Montoya told me there 
was a fight at Shooters. No, Montoya in the tape 
uses two phrases, scuffle and an incident, which I 
contend are not necessarily fights. But it's being 
characterized as a fight, again, simply to denigrate 
people who can't defend themselves. 
Again, Montoya never saw him pull --
said --he said pull the gun out and raised his 
shirt. The idea that counsel told you, it was 
irrelevant whether or not the defendant was entitled 
to have the firearm. We never got into that. We 
talked about him going into something with a 
concealed firearm because of his propensity to obey 
or not to obey the law. We didn't get into whether 
or not he could have one. Counsel talks about well, 
69 
there's the second amendment, there are permits. No 
evidence of whether anybody did or did not have 
permits 
that. 
here. I'm certain you would have heard 
What you have is in the early morning hours 
of October 20th, 1996, Henry Dennis Miera, a person 
nobody has said was involved in the altercation in 
any way , dies from two gunshot wounds tracts that go 
right through his body at the hand of the defendant 
who comes into this thing and who brings the 
concealed firearm into this and gets in everybody's 
face because he knows he's got it. And he pulls it 
out, at which point the only self-defense that takes 
place in this case is Manny Rios punching him so he 
can get away from the gun. 
Manny Rios, also not a perfect person. 
There is no extreme emotional distress except what 
the defendant brought on himself. There is no 
self-del 
force. 
Cense because there's no imminent threat of 
This while he gets up and it's kind of 
unsolicited, well, he's knock out, he gets up, he 
sees them standing over him, he's confused, he 
doesn't 
defends 
know what's going on, so he gets up and 
himself. No, they run away. 
The time frame on the tape doesn't show 
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Scott and juror Michael Ross. You are excused at 
this time. You are not permitted to deliberate. We 
thank 
do it, 
this p 
If you 
you for your service. 
Again, it's an unfortunate thing to have to 
but you have helped us just by serving to 
oint in the proceedings and we appreciate it. 
1d like to remain, watch the final outcome, 
you may do so. But only those eight who are to 
serve 
thank 
deputy 
record 
as jurors can deliberate on the case. So 
you. 
1*11 ask those eight members to follow the 
into the jury room. 
(The following proceedings were held in 
open court out of the presence of the 
jury*) 
THB COURT: You can be seated. For the 
, Counsel, let me just ask, in fact, it was 
Mr. Scott and Mr. Ross, isn't that correct, that 
were the alternate jurors? 
unders 
Counse 
wanted 
MR. LBMCKB: As we understood, your Honor. 
MR. FINLAY3OH: That's the way we 
tood it, your Honor. 
THB COURT: Okay, just so we're clear. 
1 for the defendant, you indicated that you 
to make a motion for mistrial. 
70 
The record should reflect the jury has been 
excused and this would be an appropriate time to do 
that. Go ahead if you would like. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, during 
counsel's opening part of his closing argument he 
referenced the character of our defendant, accusing 
us of packaging him as a Jimmy Stewart. Talking 
about Rios being in chains as he should be at the 
prison and our client sitting out here in the suit 
and glasses and comparing him to the video. He's 
not allowed to comment on the character of our 
client. It was never a point put at issue by us. 
We approached the bench and objected to that. 
THE COURT: You did. 
MR. FINLAYSON: And asked that there be a 
mistrial• 
We also took exception to - - we also take 
exception to Mr. Lemcke's bringing up the concealed 
weapon as showing our client's propensity to disobey 
the law, which I think is exactly what all the 
404(b) and 609 evidence is exactly trying to keep 
out. And that is trying to try Mr. Jiminez on the 
merits and not on his propensity to disobey the law. 
We would ask for a mistrial for that as well. 
And that -- and I think I've made my 
701 
objection clear on when Mr. Lemcke started into the 
fact that the jury had not been dealt with in a 
straightforward manner. I think he -- that the jury 
could take that and it is certainly reasonable for 
them to take 
them or that 
trial. It's 
that that we were hiding something from 
I have done something improper in this 
your Honor's province to decide whether 
there's something improper going on and I take 
exception to 
THE 
Mr. 
that. 
COURT: Thank you. 
Lemcke, your response to the motion for 
a mistrial on those three ground? 
MR. 
there --
THE 
MR. 
the idea that 
the defendant 
LEMCKE: Your Honor, first of all 
COURT: Pardon me. 
LEMCKE: There are three grounds and 
: -- we talked about the deportment of 
;, you know, here and there. And that 
those are different affects is proper comment on the 
deportment of a witness. The defendant did take the 
stand in thia \ particular case. His credibility is 
clearly at issue. We, in fact, attacked his 
credibility. In fact, the second --or the third 
thing that counsel complains about is that we talked 
about --
70 
being 
about 
THE COURT: Being unfairly dealt with. 
MR. LEMCKE: Oh, that the jury was not 
dealt straightforward with. 
THE COURT: Or straightforward. 
MR. LEMCKE: And that is simply talking 
I don't think that the defendant and his wife 
were telling them the truth. I was not commenting 
on Mr, , Finlayson. If Mr. Finlayson has some ill at 
ease with that, I apologize to him. I do not even 
apologize for the process, though. Because I think 
I'm entitled to comment on the defendant, as any 
other witness, whether or not I believe he's telling 
the truth. And I think that so much of what he said 
was transparently false and that is the comment on 
that. 
The other issue is -- deals with Manuel 
Rios being in chains. That was mentioned at a 
different time. To hear counsel's complaint it 
would 
suit, 
about 
be, well, here is the defendant over here in a 
and here is Manuel in chains. No, I talked 
Manuel a lot. In fact, to comment in my 
rebuttal, where counsel said, oh, he's an NFL 
lineman, I said he's not an NFL lineman, he's a USP 
inmate. We've never sold him as a church warden. 
We've only let Manuel be Manuel. 
70 
And to somehow cobble together the comments 
on Manuel as a backsided 
don't know if that shows 
of counsel, It's more so 
comment on the defendant, I 
something of the mind set 
than what happened actually 
in court. So I don't think that his comments are at 
all well made. And his motion for mistrial 
certainly isn't. 
THE COURT: Did 
second ground? 
you want to comment on the 
MR. LEMCKE: Which was? 
THE COURT: The 
said --
MR. LEMCKE: Oh, 
firearm, the -- counsel 
on the firearm. The 
problem with that was that in his close 
Mr. Finlayson went into a speech about, well, 
there's a second amendment. We're not talking about 
whether people are entitl 
there are permits. They 
.ed to have them or not, 
had nothing to do with the 
case, the second amendment or people having permits. 
We never got into that. 
into that. And I have a 
We weren't going to get 
right to rebut and come 
back and talk about we didn't talk about permits. 
We talked about the fact 
and went into this. And 
things, a propensity for 
that he concealed a weapon 
that he has, among other 
crime and aggression. And 
704 
that was, you know, clearly central to 
this case. 
So 1 bo somehow come out as thi 
the issues of 
s is 
everything that's said when I reference the 
defendant is somehow 403 or 404(b), is 
I get to comment on the defendant as a 
get to comment on the defendant as an 
that is what the issue is about. And 
complain about everything that comes i 
their client is violative and only the 
him, just isn't true* 
THE 
Counsel. 
MR. 
COURT: Okay. It's your 
FINLAYSON: Nothing else 
guess I should -- I forgot to put one 
record. I'll submit those. 
THE 
MR. 
approach the 
believed I'd 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Okay. 
FINLAYSON: But when we -
fallacious. 
witness and I 
actor. And 
to simply 
n against 
re to smear 
motion, 
on that. I 
thing on the 
- we did 
bench when Mr. Lemcke indicated that he 
miacharacterized the law. 
COURT: On aggravated assault. 
FINLAYSON: On aggravated 
I think I'd ask the Court to instruct 
statute of aggravated assault. And Mr 
don't remember what you asked for the 
assault. And 
them on the 
• Lemcke, I 
judge to do. 
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MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I asked you 
actually to do nothing. Except, you know, I did not 
object to you saying that the law of aggravated 
assault was not a part of this case. And that the 
different counsels disagree on certain issues in 
this, which is true. Also it should be part of the 
record that it was the defense who didn't want 
aggravated assault instructed in this particular 
manner. The instructions say that they contain all 
the law that's necessary and Mr. Finlayson chose to 
go beyond the jury instructions to get into an issue 
of law that we weren't -- that apparently they 
weren't set up for. 
THE COURT: I guess we could just deal with 
this last one, give the jury a supplemental 
definition of aggravated assault, if you wanted to 
do it. 
MR. LEMCKE: I would object, Your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: That's what I'd ask for. 
THE COURT: But you wanted me to, as I 
understand it, Mr. Finlayson, from our discussion 
here, you wanted me to tell the jury that your 
characterization of aggravated assault was correct, 
and I wasn't prepared to do that. 
MR. FINLAY30N: No, I did ask the Court 
70 
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then to instruct them -- I'd rea< 
what I had done to i 
injury and aggravate 
had read off of. 
MR. LEMCKB: 
counsel said broken 
injury under the law 
incorrect. 
THE COURT: 
were both arguing at 
arguable whether or 
nstruct them 
i off the statute is 
on serious bodily 
d assault because that's what I 
But at that point, your Honor, 
teeth constitute various bodily 
and that is 
Counsel, I < 
this time. 
not that Mr. 
victim of an aggravated assault. 
tell the jury that d efinitively. 
question now is aggravated assaui 
explained -- it's been relied on 
an explanation as to 
necessary. Wouldn't 
absolutely 
appreciate what you 
And it's at least 
Jiminez was a 
So I hesitate to 
So I guess my 
Lt has been 
by the defense as 
why they feel self-defense was 
it be helpful to now tell the 
jury in a brief instruction what aggravated assault 
is and let them decide for themselves? 
MR. LEMCKB: 
Honor. 
THE COURT: 
way? 
MR. LEMCKE: 
know, it is not the 
I wouldn't think so, your 
And why would you feel that 
Well, because, again, you 
statute, the law which was read, 
but it is th< 9 interpretation in the case law that 
matters whether or not this idea of broken teeth 
being serious bodily injury is there. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Well, what we --
LEMCKE: Unless we want to start 
reading the several cases that deal with this. 
THE COURT: No, my suggestion is that we 
just define aggravated assault, nothing more. Not 
make any -- not instruct the jury as to whether 
broken teeth 
MR. 
your Honor. 
MR. 
are or are not --
FINLAYSON: That's what I would like. 
LEMCKE: And we would object to it. We 
think it's surplusage and we think that they've gone 
into the jury box now, it's an invasion. 
THE 
invasion. I' 
to draft the 
the elements 
COURT: I'm not sure that it's an 
11 consider, It counsel, if you'd look 
instruction having nothing more than 
of aggravated assault. I'll take a 
look and I'll take a look whether or not it's legal 
at this point to add a supplemental instruction to 
the jury. 
MR. 
THE 
FINLAYSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
COURT: Now, in terms of the motion for 
mistrial, I'll deny it. First of all, the comments 
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of the prosecuting attorney explaining to the jury 
that, in fact, Mr. Jiminez is not Jimmy Stewart, if 
I've characterized his description truthfully, is in 
my judgment not a comment on the character of 
Mr. Jiminez. Again in opening arguments and during 
Mr. Jiminez1 own testimony, the defendant attempted 
to present to the jury an appearance or an image of 
what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention 
was. It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to 
make an effort to contradict that image. And in my 
judgment, that's what Mr. Lemcke was trying to do. 
On the second ground, commenting that I 
believe something to do with the propensity to 
violate the law as shown by carrying an illegal 
firearm. It's a touchy area, I grant, but on the 
other hand the defense implied through its closing 
argument that Mr. Jiminez had a second amendment 
right to carry a firearm. 
It didn't quite go that far, but said words 
to the effect of to the jury that haven't they heard 
about the second amendment. The clear implication 
is that the defendant has a constitutional right to 
have this gun. Apparently there's some evidence 
that he doesn't have a constitutional right to have 
a gun for various reasons. Among them possibly 
70 
because he's an illegal alien. 
The State didn't make that comment and, in 
fact, couldn't have made that comment in my 
judgment. It would have been misconduct for them to 
do so. But to follow-up and explain as they do that 
the issue is not so much that the defendant has a 
constitutional right to have a gun, but as to what 
the gun may show about his state of mind and who, in 
fact, was the aggressor. Which I think was the 
essence of what the prosecutor was saying, and again 
in my judgment is not prosecutorial misconduct. And 
I deny the motion for a mistrial on those grounds. 
And thirdly, the prosecutor's statement 
that he didn't feel that the jury was being dealt 
with in a straightforward manner or an honest 
manner, Mr. Finlayson, I think if counsel had said 
that I think the prosecutor is lying to you --or 
the defense counsel, rather, is lying to you or 
misrepresented something to you, I would agree. But 
his statements can be construed that the defendant 
himself was lying or the defense witnesses were 
lying and the jury wasn't being told the truth. He 
didn't accuse you personally of anything, and 
therefore again it wouldn't be prosecutorial 
misconduct in my judgement. There is no reason to 
7 
declare a mistrial and so I won't. 
But I'll consider submitting an aggravated 
assault instruction if you can draw one up quickly. 
And I'll try to take a look at the law to see if it 
would be appropriate even though the jury has been 
sent to the jury room to deliberate to add that 
instruction at this point. 
We'll be in recess. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you. 
MR. LEMCKE: And your Honor, before I'd 
submit that I'd ask the Court to look at -- I 
believe there's case law, it was Justice Zimmerman. 
I can't remember the case, but he said that things 
like broken fingers, broken noses and I believe 
broken teeth do not arise to an aggravated assault 
level. 
THE COURT: Your argument there is that by 
law -- as a matter of law this couldn't be an 
aggravated assault• 
MR. LEMCKE: Correct. 
THE COURT: I'm not prepared to tell the 
jury that, Counsel. Let me just explain to them 
what aggravated assault is and draw their own 
conclusion. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, it appears that 
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NOEMI MONICA JIMINEZ, 
called by the defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give In the case now 
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Be seated up here, please. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Judge. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAPIRO: 
Q Good morning, Ms. Jlmlnez. Would you for 
the record tell us your full name and spell your 
last name. 
A Noemi Monica Jlmlnez, J-i-m-i-n-e-z. 
Q Okay. We're going to ask you to speak up 
so that everybody can hear. That microphone will 
help a little bit, but please speak loud enough so 
that everybody can hear. 
Do you know the defendant? 
430 
Q 
A 
Q 
when i 
A 
0 
the po 
we app 
short 
the ju 
So you simply don't recall that? 
I don't recall it. 
All right. After your husband left Judy's, 
s the next time you had contact with him? 
That night. 
Did you participate in concealing him from 
lice for a period of time? 
MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, your Honor. May 
roach? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: I guess we'll have to take a 
recess for a period of time. I apologize to 
ry but we'll have to take a short recess and 
talk about something outside the hearing of the 
jury. So I'll ask the jury to follow the bailiff. 
Attorneys remain, please. 
there1 
(The following proceedings were held in 
open court out of the presence of the 
jury.) 
THE COURT: You can be seated. Counsel, 
s an objection to the question of the 
prosecution's attorney as to what Ms. Jiminez may 
have done to assist in hiding her husband. 
MR. LEMCKB: All right. 
4 
THE COURT: The objection is that if 
Ms. Jiminez admits helping to conceal him from the 
law, then she committed a crime. And by admitting 
that crime would have -- should have the opportunity 
to at least to be advised by counsel, separate 
counsel, as to her right not to incriminate herself. 
And then if she chooses, could exercise that Fifth 
Amendment right. 
MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, noting that the 
witness has already confessed to one crime of hiding 
the car, and we1re still within the statute of 
limitations, and that is tampering with evidence, 
we're kind of almost moot at this point on that 
particular issue. If she, in fact, wants to consult 
counsel, come back and say that she either cares to 
take the Fifth Amendment or she cares to testify, 
that would be fine. And the State, of course, would 
have to go along with that. 
But Z think that that is the option to this 
particular question. We may want to put that one on 
reserve, bring her back say after lunch and have her 
put that answer in. But as the Court noted at the 
bench, I can ask her about things she observed of 
her husband concealing himself from the law for that 
particular period of time. 
451 
saying, 
asking 
wouldn1 
THE 
Mr. 
' COURT: So if I understand what you're 
Lemcke, you'd be happy to proceed by 
her what she observed Mr. Jiminez do? 
MR. 
THE 
t be 
her what she 
taken, that 
agree that s 
counsel 
her on 
because 
before 
asking 
the def 
way? 
saying 
a right 
LEMCKE: 
' COURT: 
Yes. 
And in your judgment that 
objectionable. But if you were to ask 
herself did, the actions she may have 
could possibly incriminate her and you 
he should have the advice of independent 
, to advise her on that? 
MR. 
the s 
» you 
LEMCKE: Right. And I would just put 
tend, say I'll withdraw the question 
have the right to talk to an attorney 
you answer that one, and then move on to 
about 
THE 
ense 
MR. 
I'll 
what she observed her husband do. 
COURT: 
have any 
SHAPIRO: 
withdraw 
; to counsel. 
Importance than. It's 
question be 
rephrai ed. 
The 
stricken 
All right. Does counsel for 
objection to proceeding that 
I have an objection to him 
that question because you have 
That simply gives it more 
entitled to. I'd ask that that 
completely and that it be 
fact that Mr. Lemcke said that she's 
45 
already admitted to something is further evidence 
that what he's doing is wholly improper. To ask her 
to confess to a crime while she's on the stand 
unrepresented is unconscionable. To say now that 
because she's already done it once, doing it twice 
isn't a big deal is even worse. That's 
reprehensibly conduct I think as far as this case 
goes. And as far as our client is now concerned 
certainly to questions about her participating in 
the crime is completely irrelevant. 
If the question is what did she observe, I 
think that's a proper question. But if she's asked 
to give -- if she's being asked to give information 
that's incriminatory, that simply shouldn't be 
allowed to happen. She's entitled to counsel. 
THE COURT: She's entitled to counsel. 
It's certainly relevant what she may have done. How 
she may have assisted her husband certainly would be 
relevant. I don't agree with that part of what you 
said. If she's going to admit to a crime or be 
asked to admit to a crime in open court on the 
record then of course she's entitled to be advised 
by independent counsel and then make the choice as 
to whether she wants to exercise her Fifth Amendment 
right or not. I would agree. 
4 
So Mr. Lemcke, rather than have you explain 
that you're going withdraw the question because the 
answer may incriminate the witness --
MR. LEMCKE: I'll just withdraw the 
question. 
THE COURT: I'll just simply indicate to 
the jury that I've sustained the objection for now. 
And if you want to pursue another line of 
questioning. But I will permit you to ask her 
whether she had the understanding Mr. Jiminez was 
going to purportedly conceal himself. Any objection 
to that? 
MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, one thing before 
we bring the jury back in. I'm getting, although 
counsel wants to call me names and things, what I'm 
getting right now, unconscionable and everything 
else, I'm getting stereoed. And this is 
Mr. Shapiro's witness and Mr* Finlayson has to --
you know, he can consult with Mr. Shapiro but we 
can't have two people up and down objecting. It's 
too hard to keep track of and it's basically unfair. 
THB COURT: And I agree. I think what 
we'll have to do is designate one counsel to deal 
with a particular witness. And if there's 
cross-examination that the counsel questioning that 
45 
you, 
Mr. 
Mr. Lemcke, what evidence do you 
Jiminez may have 
behavior 
and that 
that Inc! 
except that 
been involved in 
he admitted to in 
which is the subject of this 
MR. 
Lude 
LEMCKE: 
have that 
some violent 
Los Angeles 
lawsuit? 
The entries on his rap sheet 
things again as resisting 
aggravated assault that would put him 
situations. 
you know, 
Is not a 
r iS 
arrest and 
in violent 
And again, what we're talking about, 
the basis of the doctor's 
question that was used. So I 
we'd have to 
the 
proffer it, but we will, 
entire FBI rap sheet. 
THE 
Let1 
COURT: 
' s bring 
That's as much as 
the jury back in 
opinion and 
don't think 
we'll proffer 
I'll require. 
and resume 
then with the cross-examination of Miss Jlmlnez. 
But please don't ask 
anything 
she 
•you 
the 
her whether she h 
that would have been illegal, 
observed 
MR. 
THE 
her husband do. 
LEMCKE: 
COURT: 
retake your seat 
jury 
MR. SHAPIRO, 
comes? 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
SHAPIRO 
All right. 
Yes, Ms. Jlmlnez, 
erself did 
simply what 
let's have 
at the witness stand, please. 
Judge, one ques 
Sure. 
r A lot of -- thi 
tion before 
s line of 
47 
questioning --
bench? 
jury is 
And 
THE COURT: Do you want to approach the 
MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. 
THE COURT: Bring them 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: All 
again back. And 
right, 
we 've 
counsel for the State, I'll 
objection that was made earlier 
and ask 
Honor. 
Q 
morning 
your hue 
the next 
A 
question 
you 
0 
you to move to a new li 
MR. LEMCKE: All right 
(BY MR. LEMCKE) 
of October 20th, 
After 
1996, ' 
band do to conceal hims 
year or so? 
In what way? I 
• 
All right, then 
observe your husband 
or leave 
Mr. 
to avoid arrest 
Miera? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
How long was he 
don't i 
let me 
concea 
after 
gone? 
in. 
for the record the 
had our discussions. 
sustain the 
by defense counsel 
ne of questioning. 
, thank you, your 
that particular 
what did you observe 
elf from the law over 
understand the 
break it down. Did 
1 himself from arrest 
the killing of 
47 
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witness objects to, then one of you can object, one 
of you can address the objection. 
MR. LEMCKE: And if we're going to be 
called to approach, could that rule be in effect as 
well? 
THE COURTs Pardon? 
MR. LEMCKE: If we're going to be called to 
approach the bench, could that rule be in effect as 
well? 
THE COURT: The one attorney that's dealing 
with that particular witness I would ask to approach 
the bench, make objections, argue the objections. 
MR. FINLAY3OH: We've been trying to do 
that. It's a little bit hard when Mr. Lemcke asks 
an improper question, we sort of react and jump up. 
We do -- I do have a motion 1 need to make. 
THE COURT: Let's do that now while the 
injury is out. It makes sense to do that. 60 
ahead. 
MR. PINLAYSON: Your Honor, we're going it 
make a mistrial motion at this point. There have 
been a couple of problems. Mr. Lemcke at every 
point in this trial before -- instead of before 
asking a possibly improper question he blurts it 
out. Had -- we've had a problem today with 
45 
Mr. Lemcke telling Detective Chidester to play the 
video over and over while Dr. Rothfeder is 
testifying. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you to flesh 
that out a little. Your objection was that 
apparently the detective played the videotape, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, continuously during the 
cross-examination of Dr. Rothfeder? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Playing it and at 
Mr. Lemcke's request doing that from our 
understanding of Detective Chidester. He do object 
to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that objection was 
noted and sustained. They were asked to discontinue 
the conduct. 
MR. FINLAY3ON: Mr. Lemcke asked yesterday 
when Mr. Jiminez was on the stand, you've used false 
names before, holding a sheet of paper up. We've 
provided a case to your Honor, State versus Palmer 
at 860 P2d 339, that indicates asking -- that the 
simply manner of asking the question, and I think 
the discussion starts on page 5, unsupported 
innuendo is prosecutorial misconduct. And actually 
this case was reversed based on that. And that's 
what that was, your Honor, it was prosecutor 
45 
innuendo. 
Mr. Lemcke does not have admissible 
evidence to prove that, at least he didn't properly 
to the Court. And that is prosecutor misconduct 
under Palmer. We objected to that. Your Honor had 
him not further ask any questions about that until 
we could provide you law on that. I think it's very 
clear that that's improper. That it is prosecutor 
innuendo and we would make a mistrial motion at this 
point based on our client's Fifth, Eighth, 
Fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Constitution and based on the state constitution. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FINLAYSON: In addition to that, today 
Mr. Lemcke, knowing that we had -- at the time that 
we talked about that, we also talked about whether 
or not Mr. Lemcke could talk to - - could ask any 
questions about the fact that it was a crime to 
conceal a weapon. Your Honor hadn't ruled on that 
yet and Mr. Lemcke on cross-examination of 
Ms. Jiminex blurts out, You realize that concealing 
a weapon is a crime, and having the weapon was a 
crime. 
MR. LEMCKB: Actually, that's not true, 
your Honor, I never got to that question. 
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MR. FINLAYSON: Regardless, that was an 
improper question. There are -- it is improper 
under 404(b) evidence, prior crime evidence. We are 
entitled to notice that that was going to be brought 
up. It was not charged conduct. The State has no 
purpose getting into uncharged conduct. If they had 
wanted to charge that, then they should have charged 
it in the beginning and given us notice that they 
were going to go into that. It has no relevance to 
the case whatsoever, other than to bash Mr. Jiminez' 
character and Ms. Jiminez1 character. That's 
totally improper. It obviously has no probative 
value whatsoever as to what happened in this 
incident. 
The fact that -- the question about where 
the weapon was, I don't even think is relevant. But 
before this happened, the question whether it was 
concealed, whether he walked up or not certainly 
some relevance and that was asked. But to go on 
interject, you know, he's not even asking the 
has 
and 
question, he's simply testifying, you are aware that 
that's a crime, is improper and irrelevant and 
prejudicial to our client. 
Your Honor sustained our objection, but 
believe that we're getting -- that with the two 
I 
45 
problems that we've got so far, I don't think the 
Court can instruct the jury to dis -- I think the 
Court certainly could instruct them to disregard it, 
but I don't think they can any longer. I think that 
there's been too many instances of that and I'll ask 
you that based on his constitutional right to a fair 
trial, his due process rights, that his right to --
and to testify and not be asked questions such as 
unsupported innuendo, those have been violated and 
we would ask that you declare a mistrial. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the prosecutor's 
response? 
MR. LBMCKS: Well, your Honor, counsel has 
presented the Palmer case this morning. Going back 
to the question on what happened yesterday when the 
defendant was on the stand for the limited purpose 
of introducing his medical records, or what counsel 
says purport to be his medical records, he admitted 
at that time that he used a false name and lied. At 
this point having the FBI rap sheet that lists his 
other aliases that he's used, I asked him about 
whether or not he has other -- ever used other false 
names. 
Now counsel gets up and objects and he says 
that I need to have evidence to support that. I 
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have his FBI rap sheet. I don't have evidence that 
you could use for collateral impeachment were the 
defendant to deny that. But I do have the right 
based on evidence to ask him that question. 
As to what happened today when the doctor 
was on the stand, I had the right to inquire about 
the basis for his opinion and with the defendant 
asking about two prior instances --or the defendant 
telling the doctor about two prior instances of 
violence he had been involved in, I inquired about 
the rest. Again, we had the fire storm. But that's 
proper to examine the basis. 
When we had this witness, Miss Jiminez, on 
the stand, as we still do, I asked her if she 
knew •• or in fact, we went through the conduct, the 
conduct which is criminal. I asked her about having 
the concealed gun, about this and that, I asked her 
whether or not she knew that was a crime, that was 
objected to, that wasn't answered. 
But this is not improper questioning in 
.terms of uncharged criminal conduct. If Z would 
have gone through and charged everything that could 
have been charged here, two counts of concealing 
evidence, interstate flight, being a restricted 
person in possession of a firearm, having a 
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concealed loaded firearm/ I would have heard howling 
about, oh, you're just a terrible prosecutor, 
overreaching, trying to charge everything. The 
conduct is part of this criminal episode. The fact 
that it is criminal doesn't mean we don't get to 
inquire about it. 
THE COURT: Let me stop you there, 
Mr. Lemcke. I think most of what you said the 
defense counsel would agree with. They would agree 
that the conduct itself may be a part of the 
episode, it may be relevant, but it's a 
characterization as illegal conduct. How is that 
relevant and how does that help the trier of fact 
decide in this case whether the defendant is guilty 
of the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide? 
MR. LEMCKE: It goes to that, your Honor, 
because the defense has raised from opening 
statement this contention of who was the aggressive 
party. Who was that. The defendant illegally being 
possessed of a firearm, the defendant criminally 
concealing the firearm, the defendant going out into 
the public, knowing that he was -- had others at an 
advantage that they were unaware of. It goes to 
this entire question of aggressiveness and who was 
the initial aggressor. If, you know, if we even get 
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beyond the legality of it and let that go, 
that he has it and the fact that he has it 
and the fact that he 
aggressive nature of 
we are. 
I'd also re 
the fact 
concealed 
goes out this way, goes to the i 
the conduct. And that's where 
fer the Court to the Palmer case 
in subparagraph 5, where the prosecutorial 
misconduct is the prosecutor asked the defendant 
to -- about his gues 
his attorneys and sa 
the jury and tell yo 
a complete innuendo 
do with conduct. 
When we are 
conduct in getting a 
tioning and his preparation with 
id, he didn't tell you 
u exactly what to say. 
to face 
That is 
question. That has nothing to 
talking about the defendant's 
firearm that he's not entitled 
to have because of his status, about concealing it, 
about going out and 
evidence to this par 
to the crime. We're 
they're illegal. I 
then going and concealing the 
ticular crime, they are relevant 
talking about whether 
think I agree probably 
relevant to this jury. 
THS COURT: 
MR. LEMCKB: 
Palmer case is just 
THE COURT: 
Okay. 
But to say that this 
-- it just isn't true. 
I think I understand. 
or not 
isn't 
is the 
Counsel, 
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just briefly in response? 
MR. FINLAYOSN: Just 
I'm sorry, I forgot the other 
that Mr. Lemcke brings it up. 
talked about did he tell you 
violence that he was involved 
Again, it's the innuendo. It 
briefly, your Honor. 
objection and I'm glad i 
I objected when he 
about any prior 
in with Dr. Rothfeder. 
is exactly innuendo, 
every one of those three instances have been 
innuendo. One, you've used f< 
I think for the record we nee< 
to the Court what admissible < 
those three innuendos, first 
alse names before. Now 
i Mr. Lemcke to proffer 
evidence he had for 
the false --
THE COURT: Let me ask you about that 
before I ask Mr. Lemcke to do 
Palmer case and just quickly 
concern there, I'm looking at 
column, about the very middle 
anything. I read the 
skimmed it, but the 
page 5, the right-hand 
of the column it says. 
Generally it's error to ask an accused a question 
that implies the existence of a prejudicial fact 
unless the prosecution can prove the existence of 
the fact. Otherwise the only limit on the line of 
questioning be with the prosecution's imagination. 
And then the last paragraph o f that sentence says, 
Hence, we can conclude the prosecutor's questions 
which imply in the culpatory facts that were 
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unsupported by that would support error. ' 
And I would agree with you and Mr. Lemcke 
and rule that before you can ask questions that 
would be prejudicial, you have to have evidence that 
proves it. But I think Mr. Lemcke's point is a good 
one too, and that is that the question in this 
particular case wasn't just a product of his 
imagination because he has an FBI rap sheet that 
shows that the defendant has used several aliases. 
Now, according to the Palmer case, before 
he can ask the defendant about that he has to have 
the evidence that can prove the existence of the 
fact. And 
admissible 
case where 
that would imply that he has to have 
evidence. But we're not talking about a 
Mr. Lemcke just fished something out of 
the air that he pulled something from his 
imagination in order to discredit the defendant. Is 
that fair? 
MR !. FINLAYSON: I haven't seen what he's 
proffered or what he's -- there's been no proffer to 
me or to the Court of what exactly he's looking at. 
| He flashed 
copy of it, 
need --on 
whether Mr. 
some piece of paper that I haven't seen a 
that's what I'm saying. I think we 
those three instances we need to know 
Lemcke does have admissible evidence. I 
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agree with you, if he had whatever he was sent by 
the FBI as a rap sheet that may not be out of his 
imagination, but I don't think this case is based on 
imagination. I think what they're saying is that --
that's one of the big problems with that is that 
otherwise if they don't make some rule like that, 
then you could just out of your imagination come up 
with a great way of cross-examining somebody and 
make him look really bad. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. FINLAYSON: But it's certainly not the 
rule. The rule is that there has to be admissible 
evidence before that can be asked. And I ask that 
that evidence be proffered to the Court on all three 
of those instances, Including prior -- whether he 
has certified copies of prior violent convictions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you have anything 
else by way of response? 
IfR. FIMLA Y3 ON : No . 
THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke, did you have 
.something you wanted to add? 
MR. LEMCKE: Well, your Honor, first of all 
it would only apply to Mr. Jiminez because Palmer 
applies to that, which is asking the accused. In 
terms of asking the doctor, that's the -- what data 
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he had that goes to the basis of his opinion, that's 
clearly a proper question. 
We have instances of the defendant involved 
in conduct and they're not convictions but they're 
involved in conduct, one of them which was 
originally charged as an aggravated assault with a 
knife. And when the doctor is talking about his 
basis for his opinion of the condition of the 
defendant's head because of prior violence done to 
it, then what he knows about the prior violence done 
to the defendant's head is proper basis for his 
opinion. 
In terms of what was asked to the defendant 
yesterday, which is the only question in front of 
us, I had some evidence, I had the FBI rap sheet. 
Mr. Finlayson got that in his discovery. He's had 
that for a long time. The fact that, you know, he 
hadn't looked at it in a while is not my fault. And 
like I say, I had evidence upon which to ask the 
question --
THE COURT: Does the -- let me interrupt 
you, Counsel. I'm sorry to interrupt. 
MR. LEMCKE: I did not have the collateral 
evidence that would be required to impeach him. 
THB COURT: But does the FBI rap sheet list 
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1 aliases for Mr. Jiminez? 
2 MR. LEMCKE: It does. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. Anything else? 
4 MR. FINLAYOSN: Well, no. I've got -- I 
5I don't know how many volumes of discover I've got on 
6 It. It's Irrelevant. It's not admissible evidence. 
7I An FBI rap sheet is not admissible evidence. 
8 1 THE COURT: I agree. 
9I MR. FINLAYSON: And we already had -- I 
10I mean, add to that the fact that you've ruled, we had 
11 Judge Noel rule and then you ruled that no prior 
12 crimes or anything of that such nature can come in 
13 on my client. And with those rulings he's getting 
14 1 up and asking questions -- it may not be that he's 
15 asking Mr. Jiminez while he's on the stand, instead 
16 1 he's asking the doctor, has he told you about any 
17 prior violence that's he's been involved in. He's 
18 up there asking his wife, don't you realize that's a 
19 crime. That's still innuendo against my client. 
20I And so the Palmer case does apply to those. 
21] It1s not just when our client is on the 
22I stand. It's innuendo that involves our client that 
23 make him look bad. It still goes to the same thing. 
24I He doesn't have had admissible evidence for any of 
25 that. And I think what I'm getting form Mr. Lemcke 
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is he still doesn't think there's any problem with 
that and we're going to have a continuing problem 
where myself and Mr. Shapiro, I don't know how 
Mr. Lemcke termed it, but a whirl wind where we jump 
up and have to object. The jury is sitting there 
watching that, the question is out there, we don't 
have any choice but to object because we waive the 
whole issue if -- from the appellate court 
standpoint if we don't. And the jury sees us jump 
up and object and Mr. Lemcke has everything he wants 
right then. He has the innuendo. He has us jumping 
up. He has the jury looking at that and the jury 
saying, wow, there's something that they don't want 
us to know. 
And regardless of whether you sustain our 
objection or not, that innuendo is in there. And 
all of those occasions that's happened and 
Mr. Lemcke even when he goes to ask her whether she 
knows she was involved in concealing and that kind 
of a crime, doesn't have the forthrightness to 
before you ask that question inquire whether we have 
a Fifth Amendment issue with our client, with our 
witness• 
There are states that make that an ethical 
rule that you can't ask a question that you have 
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1 some knowledge will respond in a Fifth Amendment 
2 right without bringing that up to the Court. That 
3 should have been brought up to the Court. And this 
4 1 is over and over happening again and it's getting to 
5 the point where the jury is thinking that all of our 
6 witnesses have something wrong with them. And we - -
7 1 we're trying to hide something. 
8 MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor --
9 MR. FINLAYSON: I can't -- there's no way 
10 the Court and there's no way I can fix that problem. 
11 THE COURTS Okay. Well, I think I 
12 understand and I'm ready to rule. It's the 
13 defendant's motion, I've given them the last word. 
14 So I'll try to address them and hopefully cover 
15 everything. And I'll start first of all with the 
16 request that wa discussed yesterday by the 
17 prosecution to ask Mr. Jiminez on cross-examination 
18 about his use of other aliases and I'll sustain the 
19I defendant's, in affect, motion in limine to that 
20 question. 
211 Based on my reading of the Palmar case 
22 which seams to say that bafora that kind of question 
23 can ba asked, before a question can ba asked that 
24 impugns in soma way the defendant, the prosecution 
25 1 would hava to hava proof that would ba admissible of 
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the fact that question would elicit. So I sustain 
the motion In limine and ask the prosecutor not to 
do that. 
In fact, I would agree with Mr. Flnlayson, 
Mr. Lemcke, that any time that you're going to ask a 
question that may be even remotely controversial, I 
would ask that we approach the bench, iron that out 
beforehand rather than just try the question and 
have the objection made and then have the kind of 
problem where we have to excuse the jury and do this 
again and again or approach the bench. I agree, I 
would like to have you come forward first and then 
we can resolve it. 
I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial 
however because, number one, with respect to 
Mr. Lemcke1s question yesterday to Mr. Jlminez about 
his use of aliases, it seems to me that's mitigated 
somewhat by the fact that Mr. Jimines had admitted 
on direct examination he used an alias and admitted 
on cross-examination he lied and gave his health 
care provider false information. And Mr. Lemcke 
then attempted to follow-up, at least that's one way 
you could look at it, that same question that the 
defense even asked him with other questions about 
possible other aliases. 
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And I'd further conclude based on what I've 
heard proffered here today that there are aliases 
listed on the FBI rap sheet and although 
Mr. Lemcke -- or the State rather doesn't have 
admissible evidence that the defendant has used 
other aliases, there was some basis for that 
question, the aliases listed on the FBI rap sheet. 
And the harm to -- the unfair harm to the 
defendant's case does not, based on that problem 
alone, require a mistrial. 
Second, tha request for mistrial based on 
questions to Mrs. Jiminas about whathar she was 
aware that concealing a weapon is a crime, I agree 
that tha fact that Mr. Jiminas may have brought with 
him a weapon into tha stora, that it was concealed 
and how he used it, may go to his state of mind. 
And the question of whether or not he was the 
initial aggressor or not, tha jury may find it 
relevant that ha was armed in tha first place in 
determining whathar or not ha or tha assailants were 
tha aggressors. So tha evidence itself, tha 
conduct, would ba relevant. The fact that it may be 
characterized as illegal would not ba relevant. And 
I sustained tha objection. 
The witness is not required to answer and 
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1 again it's my judgment that there wasn't sufficient 
2 1 unfair harm to the defendant's case such that a 
3 mistrial would be warranted. 
4 1 Thirdly, the question to Dr. Rothfeder 
5 today about whether the defendant had informed him 
6 during their consultation about other injuries 
7 sustained as a result of violence, or words to that 
8 1 effect, again other kinds of head injuries or 
9 similar injuries that would have had a concussive 
10 impact that Mr. Jiminez may have suffered would be 
11 relevant. 
12 The question or the part of it as to 
13 whether they were sustained as the part of some 
14 violent behavior would not be relevant. And again I 
15 sustained the objection, finding that that part of 
16I the answer would not be relevant. Whether he had 
17 head injuries from any source that may have had this 
18 concussive impact was relevant, but not how he 
19I received them. But again there's not enough unfair 
20 damage to Mr. Jiminez1 case based on that question 
21I to warrant a mistrial. And I'll deny the motion on 
22 all three grounds. 
23 But again Mr. Lemcke, I will emphasize in 
24 the future bring those questions to the bench so we 
25 don't face this situation again. 
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THE COURT: Again for the record the ten 
jurors are present as well as the parties. 
And counsel, we're now to the point of the 
closing summary. So Counsel for the State, would 
you like to make an argument? 
MR. LEMCKB: The State would, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can proceed. 
MR. LEMCKB: Thank you, your Honor, 
Mr. Jiminez, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury. 
I hope you111 pardon ma for skipping over 
the grand aloquanca flourish and just kind of 
getting right down to the cases. What we have is a 
fairly unique case because of the evidence that is 
here. The State has charged Mr. Jiminez with one 
count of murder, a firearm enhanced murder, and two 
counts of attempted murder, again firearm enhanced, 
for the death of Henry Miera that took place on 
October 20th, 1996, and the shootings that took 
place with, we contend, to kill or the attempt to 
kill Anthony Montoya and Manuel Rios that same time, 
same place. 
We have these -- this we'll get into a few 
minutes, all our charges are built around what are 
called elements. It's important for you to remember 
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that each of these elements Is important. If we 
don't prove all the elements, we haven't proven our 
case. The State Is required to prove everything 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is our burden, this 
is what we must do. 
We have again a fairly unique piece of 
evidence in this videotape. You, unlike almost any 
other jury I can think of, have gotten to witness 
the actual killing take place. There is little 
doubt mechanically about some of the things that 
have happened here. There is little doubt — 
there's no doubt what happened in terms of the death 
of Mr. Miera, in that he was shot twice in the side 
with a .45 caliber pistol that was fired by 
Mr. Jiminez at him. There is no doubt that 
Mr. Jiminez, who fired at these other people, fired 
approximately seven rounds that we know. 
There is some dispute in somethings, 
including some sequential things that happened here. 
The dispute is two sided. On the one side you have 
Mr. and Mrs. Jiminez who have given us their 
versions of the events. On the other side you've 
had Mr. Montoya literally who is speaking to us from 
the dead in the interview, and Mr. Rios who came 
here to court. And there are some important 
6 
distinctions in what they say happened. 
The Jiminezes in very brief summary, and 
we'll get into that in a second, said that, in fact, 
when they got to the 7-Eleven that Mr. Jiminez was 
given some bad words by the three people. That he 
got into a confrontation with them. That he was 
struck and that he came up with a gun. 
Mr. Montoya and Mr. Rios have told us a 
somewhat different sequence. They told us that, 
yes, there was the verbal confrontation. That 
everybody went to get in on it. That, in fact, at 
one point the defendant was, and again Mr. Rios put 
this three different ways at the three different 
times of his testimony, going for a gun, he was 
punched about the time that Rios saw the gun, and he 
was reaching for a gun. Maybe I have those wrong 
one or another, but anyway, he said that the 
defendant was going for a gun. 
The defendant indeed told us at that point 
in time that he had a -- the .45 caliber automatic 
stuck in his pants with the T-shirt or the shirt 
over it. That when he saw that Mr. Montoya threw 
the punch, that the defendant got up shooting and 
then again that he does shoot Mr. Miera, he shoots 
at the other two, he chases them in front of the car 
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and the rest of the sequence of what happened. 
You have a number of different charges that 
you are to consider. Not may consider, but you must 
consider. There's no particular sequence that you 
are to consider them in. You don't look at one and 
say, well, this, that, then we move to the other. 
You look at them in a package. We start with the 
death of Henry Miera, which is essentially the 
essence of what we're doing today. 
We have on the one hand murder. And murder 
is -- and again that is on or about on the 20th day 
of October, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Defendant, Jose Mario Jiminez, caused the 
death of Henry D. Miera. All the evidence is of 
that. That's the time. That's the place. It's in 
Salt Lake County. This is the man who shot, and 
that's the man who died. And it was those bullets 
that caused his death. 
That the defendant then and there caused 
the death, intentionally or knowingly is the next 
element of murder, or intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly 
dangerous to human life, which act caused the death 
of Henry D. Miera, or acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, the 
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defendant engaged in conduct which created a grave 
risk of death to another and caused the death of 
Henry D. Miera, and that the defendant did so 
unlawfully without legal justification. 
Shooting someone in the side -- and there's 
an instruction in there about intent, that intent 
can be inferred when you shoot someone in the side, 
twice in the torso, twice, it can be clearly 
inferred that you were trying to kill them. Or that 
you were tending to cause serious bodily injury to 
someone by shooting them twice in the side, or that 
shooting someone twice in the side is an act of 
depraved indifference to their particular human 
life. 
Then we get to the idea that the defendant 
did so unlawfully without legal justification. We 
move then into the concept of legal justification. 
Among these that is mentioned in this is defense of 
self; was the defendant, Mr. Jiminez, defending 
himself or was he defending another, his wife. 
If, in fact, you find that he was defending 
himself, committing -- or acting in self-defense, as 
defined by the law, in the shooting of Mr. Miera, in 
the shooting at Mr. Montoya, in the shooting at 
Mr. Rios, Mr. Jimines is entitled to an acquittal. 
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If you find that -- or if you find a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Jiminez did this acting in < 
self-defense as defined by the law, you ought to 
acquit him. I will argue to you and I will tell you 
in a minute why, in fact, that is not the case. 
Then we move to two other counts, to the 
manslaughter counts. Under the laws of the State of 
Utah there are two circumstances which say if you 
kill somebody and it would otherwise be murder, but 
you are acting under extreme emotional disturbance 
or incomplete or imperfect self-defense, which are 
defined, then even though it would have been murder 
and all the elements are met, that you should find 
this person -- convict them of manslaughter, which 
is a lesser offense than murder. But again, if he's 
acting in complete or perfect self-defense, he's 
entitled to an acquittal. 
But you have to look at the definitions 
that take place in incomplete self --or 
self-defense, incomplete self-defense and extreme 
emotional disturbance. And then you have the duty, 
it is your job to go back over to the evidence this 
doctor told you. These are things that you have to 
consider, that's what you're here for. Do the facts 
fit the situation as described by the Jiminizes or 
6 4 
by Mr. Montoya and Mr. Rios? 
When you talk about self-defense, complete 
self-defense, you're entitled to defend yourself 
against another, against such other's eminent use of 
unlawful force against you or the third person* 
However, you are entitled to -- excuse me, 
entitled to use force against that person, 
force, force that is intended or likely to 
death or serious injury only under the law 
reasonably believe that force is necessary 
you are 
deadly 
cause 
if you 
to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to you or 
another. 
And a person is not justified in 
self-defense if he's attempting to commit, 
committing, or fleeing from the commission 
felony or he was the aggressor. 
Then we get into the count -- the 
of a 
idea of 
imperfect self-defense where under circumstances 
where the actor reasonably believes the 
circumstances provide a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct, although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the 
circumstances. In other words, I'm defending 
myself, but he does so inappropriately. But he has 
reason that he's legally entitled to do so 
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appropriately and 
Extreme 
triggered by some 
Such disturbance, 
therefore cannot 
defendant's own p 
I the law says he's not. 
emotional distress must be 
thing external to the accused. 
extreme emotional disturbance, 
have been brought by the 
articular mental processes or by 
his knowing or intentional involvement in a crime. 
When we 
the two versions 
of the Jiminezes 
go back to the two circumstances, 
of events, let us 
in their version. 
look at the event 
They got there, 
Mr. Jiminez was cold cocked just out of the blue by 
Mr. Rios. Was he 
Did Mr. Rios rema 
was there himself 
wife to defend? 
Look aga 
the Rios/Montoya 
time Manuel Rios 
going for a gun. 
been a verbal alt 
looking at each o 
problem? I don't 
defending himself when he got up? 
in? Possibly. Was there some --
to defend? Yes. 
Yes. 
Was there his 
in at the other version of events, 
version of the vents. That at the 
throws the punch. 
He was going to g 
the defendant was 
ret into what had 
ercation, a name calling match. 
ther, going, have 
have a problem. 
problem? What are you going to do 
going to introduc 
you got a 
Have you got a 
about it? I was 
e a gun, a firearm to a 
name-calling contest. Was pulling it out. 
64 
Interestingly enough in the Montoya/Rios 
version of events, there is a good example of 
self-defense, complete self-defanse under the law of 
the State of Utah, and that self-defense is on 
behalf of Manual Rios who seeing someone coming up 
with a gun, throwa a punch at that parson before 
they could coma up with a gun. And as you will see 
when you look at tha tape, ha throwa that punch and 
immediately ha turns his heel* and ha runs. 
Now wa gat into those factora, ladies and 
gentleman, that are tha external factora that I 
submit to you will tall you which of these two 
versions of avanta ia true. And I put them to you 
rhetorically in a number of questions. 
First of all, you have seen Manual Rios. 
And a fair amount of my questions to you are going 
to be -- and they1re not queetione for you to answer 
ma, I don't want you to aay this ia tha quaation and 
have you give ma answers. These are thinga that you 
need to anawar among yourselves. You've seen Manuel 
Rios. Ha ia an anormoua man* You have seen the 
defendant, Mr. Jiminas, ha ia not that big a man. 
You've seen on videotape soma scale, in fact on two 
different videotapaa, soma scale of how big Anthony 
Montoya, Jr. ia. I would submit to you 
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approximately the size of Mr. Jiminez. 
Were Mr. Jiminez not the aggressor, were he 
not the person who we now know by his own version 
had gone ahead, gotten out of the car, pulled up his 
shirt, stuffed the automatic in his pants, pulled 
the shirt down and gone and gotten into this 
situation. We now see by the videotape he's walking 
in, he hears something, he tells us it's murmurs, I 
heard murmurs. You hear murmurs, do you go ask 
someone what's your problem? He went back into the 
situation. He goes from turning into the Sev, he 
turns back and goes over there to the car to 
confront it. He's got the sneaky-peeky, he knows 
he's got the upper hand nobody knows about. 
If you are Jose Jiminez and you're not the 
aggressor and you know that you don't have that 
hidden gun ready to go, do you get in the face of 
Manuel Rios? Do you get in the face of Manuel Rios 
plus Junior Montoya? 
If you're Manuel Rios, you know what looks 
on this film to be a pretty good punch, you knock a 
guy to the ground, and you are not doing that to get 
away from somebody with a gun, do you throw a second 
punch? Do you kick him while he's down? Do you 
maybe do a victory dance over your fallen opponent? 
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Why does 
turning 
a man like Manuel Rios throw the punch, 
on his heels to get out of there unless he 
was ducking out of tha way of tha gun? 
what wa 
kills Ha 
T-shirt 
of a .45 
tha ona 
callbar 
laast br 
tha gun, 
How would Manual Rios -- and let's go to 
see of the defendant on tha night that ha 
nry Miera. He's got that long shirt, 
on, sufficient to cover something tha size 
caliber. And Detective Chidester told you 
he showed you is tha smallest of the .45 
version. Unless Jiminez is bringing --at 
inging tha shirt up and having his hand on 
how do these guys sea it unless the 
dafandant Is going for it alraady? 
You remember -- you remember Mr. Moyes, not 
Dr. Moyas, told us that that first bullet hola --
remember wa want through tha whole thing with 
Dr. Noyas yastarday, and wa got tha scraping and wa 
got tha 
and fina 
whan wa 
standing 
baan no 
tha only 
pealing and we've got tha groves and lands 
lly gat up and ask him on cross, Mr. Moyes, 
gat down to tha question where is tha guy 
r whan ha shot that bullet, oh, ha could hava 
mora than 15 inches off tha ground. When is 
> time someone was shooting? Whan the 
dafandant was on tha ground. 
How -- and you look at tha time frames, I 
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want you to watch these time frames. And it's such 
a brief period of time with the shirt that's draped 
over the gun, you gotta come up, you gotta get it 
out, you gotta get it pointed. Unless he had his 
hand on it when he was hit, unless he was going for 
it before he was hit, how is he able to shoot it in 
that instantaneous period of time when he's on the 
ground unless he had it is in his hand when he was 
going down? Because he was going for it when Manny 
threw the punch. 
What else makes sense? Because it's what 
Mr. Moyes tells us about from where down here that 
shot came. It's not like all those shots were into 
the car not out of it. And how quickly it must be 
down -- if you look at the videotape, you're going 
to see over these glass doors, Mrs. Jiminez is 
standing there, Rios is over there when he throws 
the punch and if you look very, very carefully, you 
could see some of the muzzle flashes from when the 
defendant was on the ground. He had that gun in his 
hand when he hit the ground because he went for it 
when he was standing up and that's why Manny threw 
the punch and that's why Manny ran. 
Manny doesn't run from people. Manny may 
be a lot of things, but Manny isn't somebody who is 
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going to run from people, especially if he's got 
somebody like Junior there next to him. 
You notice this too, Junior is a little 
slower on the uptake, it takes him just an instant 
longer to run. And you notice one third thing, 
which is that car door. Remember counsel saying in 
his opening argument, well, he hasn't told you about 
the car door in opening and closing. I didn't tell 
you about the 7-Eleven clerk ducking down behind the 
counter either. I didn't tell you about everything 
you were going to see in the tape. But if you look 
at when the car door opens and closes, it opens and 
closes when the defendant is on the ground shooting. 
Because Henry Niera was trying to get away. 
There's been these insinuations, innuendo, 
insinuation, that oh, it was Henry Dennis Mlera that 
had a gun in the car. Let me ask you this. If he 
had a gun and was pointing it, why didn't he shoot? 
If he had a gun and was pointing it, why would he 
open the door? If he had a gun and was shooting it 
either right or left-handed, how would he get these 
two parallel shots right through him in the side? 
Because he didn't. Because he just tried that 
instant when the gun came out and everybody, oh, my 
Qod, it's a gun, we're going to get out of here, he 
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was going to get out of there and went the wrong 
direction. 
He opens the door and he closes it. Look 
at the timing on that. Mr. Jiminez said it was 
before that, much before that he's opening the door. 
We1re only talking instance, we're only talking 
seconds. But that's when this all takes place. 
The defendant comes up shooting. The 
defendant would say this is self-defense. It is not 
self-defense by law to bring a firearm to an 
argument. It is not self-defense by law to shoot 
someone who punches you, even if they weren't 
punching you to prevent them from shooting you. 
It is not self-defense by law to come up 
with a gun in the inference because we know he 
killed one man, we know he shot at two others, that 
he was going to come up there to kill you. To say, 
well, now it's self-defense. It's not self-defense 
by law if you are attempting to commit a felony. 
And killing these people, folks, is a felony. 
Shooting him is a felony. 
Extreme emotional disturbance, I was hit, 
it was pain. The doctor, who is a substantial 
witness, told us it hurts to get hit in the face. 
But again, in your instructions, you look at what 
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extreme emotional disturbance is, something external 
to the accused, it therefore cannot have been 
brought 
or by hi 
crime. 
upon by his own particular mental processes 
s knowing or intentional involvement in a 
You can't say I'm going to pull a gun on 
these guys and I get punched and get a surprised 
punch, I was just disturbed. I was just so 
distraught at not getting it done in the first 
place, that somebody hit me in the face, this is 
disturb! ng to me, therefore it's an extreme 
emotional disturbance. I now have license to kill 
one and 
not how 
entitled 
self-def 
directed 
man who 
shooting 
he comes 
the car 
was the 
believe 
trying to kill the other two. No, that's 
it is defined. 
Imperfect self-defense that he was legally 
> to do that. He wasn't entitled to 
ense because there was no imminent force 
. his way. When he comes up shooting, the 
hit him is running away. When he comes up 
', the other man is trying to run away. When 
up shooting, the third man is sitting in 
and flinching and getting killed. And that 
guy who wasn't even in the argument. 
There are reasons to believe and not to 
witnesses. You look at Manuel Rios, would 
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you want to get into a street fight on the wrong 
side of Manuel Rios? No. Manuel Rios is a violent 
man. A man with a violet history, violent 
tendencies. He's in prison now. He has used guns 
in the past. He came right out on the stand and 
told you if he'd had a gun would he have thrown a 
beer bottle? You ask yourself from what you know of 
Manuel Rios if Manny Rios had been shot at and 
having his friends shot at and he would have had a 
gun with him, would he have run away? No. Would he 
have shot back? Yes. 
But the defendant is going to say, no, this 
is imperfect self-defense. It's not imperfect 
self-defense because you don't even have the 
foundation for self-defense. There's no force being 
directed against him. Certainly no force being 
directed against his wife when he gets up shooting. 
Everybody else was trying to get the hell out of his 
way because they'd seen him with a gun. 
We then consider the credibility of the 
Jimineses. A couple with extremely selective 
memory. Mrs. Jiminez, she remembers I saw the 
punch, my husband was trying to come in, I saw the 
whole punch. I didn't see the shooting. I saw the 
car door. Look at the video. Interesting situation 
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to look 
doorway. 
at. She comes over and there is the open 
Next to that open doorway there's the door 
now swung open and propped open. So you got the 
door Itself, the wall, she goes over and gets behind 
it. 
and the 
take a 1 
credible 
car door 
What else is between her and her husband 
car? One extremely huge hunk of Rios. You 
ook at that and you tell me if it is 
that she saw her husband, the punch, the 
, all that. Although she didn't seem to see 
or remember much else. Didn't know he took the gun 
with him 
himself, 
what he 
Didn't know he had the gun. 
Mr. Rios -- or Mr., excuse me, Jiminez 
what he has told us is very interesting of 
can't remember. Oh, he can remember being 
afraid and being punched and not going for the gun 
and all 
with him 
that of 
fear for 
carrying 
this sort of good stuff. He took the gun 
because he was in fear for his life and 
his spouse. He can't remember why he was in 
his life. He can't remember if he was 
a concealed firearm earlier that year. He 
can't remember if it was the year before. He can't 
remember 
because 
fearful 
why he decided to buy it, but it was 
he was in fear of his life. It was such a 
event that he was going to go get this 
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thing, put it in his pants, hide it, and go after 
people. But he can't tell us what that event was, 
why he was in fear for his life. 
He can't remember shooting. He can't 
remember aiming. He can't remember clearing the 
jam. He can't remember loading the gun. He can't 
remember the recoil. He can't remember those things 
that are important to him. 
Also I ask you this, in terms of the 
defendant and his credibility as to the events, you 
have had a chance to see not only the defendant in 
this courtroom today and this week with how he 
presents himself, with how he packages himself in 
appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and 
demeanor, in temper or lack thereof, you have seen 
him in every one of those aspects on October 20th, 
1996. Is this an honest packaging? 
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios 
should be in chains. But Manny Rios isn't anything 
except what Manny Rios is. But you have -- and I 
recall -- I want you to recall Mr. Shapiro's opening 
statement, and he was talking about the newly -- the 
couple, not newly married couple, but the couple, 
they had gotten their child a baby-sitter and they 
were able to go out for this date. Just your 
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1 average couple. And on the other hand we had the 
2 drunken rowdy trouble making boxers cruising for 
3 1 trouble. Is either one of those portrayals honest 
4 now that you know the situation? Or is it part of 
5 the packaging? 
6 We have had the doctor talk to us about 
7I extreme emotional distress. About how pain 
8 I translates into emotion. He talked to us in very 
9 good detail about someone named Sanchez who in 1994 
10 was beaten up in Los Angeles, had a depressed skull 
111 fracture, the broken jaw, the broken arm. The 
12 defendant said, oh, that's me. Sanchez, yeah, I was 
13 just lying to my medical providers because I wanted 
14 the services I didn't have to pay for. 
15 And the doctor also talked in generalities 
16 1 about someone who is hit with a punch like this. 
17 One of the reasons he's talking in specifics about 
18 '94 and generalities about '96, he -- the doctor had 
19 no medical records to work from from what happened 
20 in 1996. He said a person might be hit like this, 
21I they might react this way. They -- and he looked at 
22 the tape and talked about the defendant and he said, 
23 trying to find the specific language, that he was 
24 not completely aware. Which I questioned him on, 
25 and he said, yeah, that's different from being 
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completely unaware. And not completely aware and 
completely unaware are two ends of the spectrum. 
And the defendant was somewhere In the middle and he 
couldn't put him on there. 
Now I'm going to propose to you a theory 
and it's one that I hope Manuel Rios will forgive me 
for. Maybe the punch wasn't all that good. Knocked 
him down. Even Manny said I thought it knocked him 
out, but maybe it wasn't that good. He got up 
shooting. He got up shooting real fast. Maybe the 
defendant wasn't so hurt as to have this, you know, 
not knowing where I am, not knowing that I'm 
shooting, you know, not knowing that these people 
are there, not knowing that, you know, I'm pulling 
the trigger, not knowing that I'm aiming. I don't 
remember aiming. 
You heard about the recoil on a .45. Boom, 
boom. I don't know if any of you shoot, that's a 
couple of pretty good shots together, nice pair of 
parallel tracks right through poor Mr. Miera. For 
someone who doesn't remember all this but could 
remember to chase the people, I mean, he went after 
them. He just didn't get up shooting and stagger, 
he went after them. He comes over, boom, boom into 
the car. It jams, he clears that, he runs around 
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the car after them. 
He tells his wife, you know, he knows 
enough, come on, we got to get out of here* Get 
over there. They locked the car. Got to go over 
and unlock the car, let her in, drive away. He knew 
to go over to Amber Fabela'a. Ha knew to hide the 
car in her garage« He knew to go over to Judy's. 
He knew to find some people that would help him to 
get out of town and ditch the gun. He knew he had 
to do that. 
What doaa thia say? Two things it says. 
one, ha9a pretty awara of what'a going on. Two, he 
doesn't think ha naada medical attention for this 
horrible blow. And ha1a a man who will seek medical 
attention, even at someone else"a expense. But he 
did other things. He says, I don't remember killing 
anyone. I don't remember knowing if anyone was hit. 
What'a ha talking about whan ha gata ovar to Judy's 
and Amber Fabela'a there? Killed him. I killed 
him. The defendant hae no mora told you the truth 
than ha told the truth to hia medical providers in 
Southern California, if indeed thoaa ara hla medical 
records. 
Intareatingly enough, the CAT scan, you 
remember the impressions, no evidence of a skull 
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fracture. No evidence of a broken jaw. No evidence 
of brain damage. If these, in fact, are his medical 
records. I think he's lying to the doctor here. 
Complete self-defense because someone is 
coming onto you with imminent force is belied by 
your viewing of the tape. When he's shooting, no 
one is threatening him. Imperfect self-defense? 
Kind of interesting in that although his head is so 
scrambled for all that's going on of this terrible 
punch he would tell you he suffered, he is reasoning 
about the legal consequences of shooting at people. 
Or that he's reasoning about the well-being of his 
wife who he has taken to all these various 
occasions, closed a bar with, come on over, and then 
leaves. Has her participate with him in hiding the 
car, in and of itself a crime. And then leaves her 
for a period of years. 
But yet, oh, no, I'm Jimmy Stewart. I'm 
the all-American virtue. I'm just trying to defend 
fair womanhood* That's not true. And the extrinsic 
things, the idee of Manuel running, the idea of him 
getting in Manuel's face, the idea that how does he 
start shooting that quickly if he doesn't already 
have the gun in his hand when he's hit. 
By his version he gets knocked down on the 
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ground, then he has to go for the gun What did he 
have to do to go for the gun? Pull the shirt up, , 
get the gun out, get it pointed. There's not enough 
time for that. He had the gun in his hand when he 
went down. He's just going for it when he's hit 
because Manny Rios is telling you the 
Junior is telling you the truth. 
Oh, I thought I saw a person 
truth, because 
pointing a gun 
at me. And even though somebody may say, oh, this 
is the OJ Simpson crime scene so this, r so that. 
People were able to find five or six projectiles, 
they're like that. Guns would have been found. 
There was no gun. There was no -- the trash cans 
were searched. It was searched. There was no gun. 
And if Miera has a gun, why doesn't he shoot when he 
sees the other guy going down with a gun? And if he 
has a gun, why doesn't he shoot? Why 
bother to open the door? If he's got 
pointing it, oh, no, I'm pointing it. 
wait, I'll open the door, I'll get on 
good job, I'll shoot. Okay, get back 
it makes no sense. 
does he even 
a gun and is 
so I will 
out, I'll do a 
in. No, no, 
You got to view the deportment of both the 
defendant and his wife on the stand. And from those 
things they chose not to remember, you should choose 
664 
not to believe them in any of this. You should 
choose to realize there is no self-defense because 
there was no imminent force because this is in 
reaction -- this is the defendant himself committing 
the crime and not allowed to commit -- or to call it 
self-defense. That he is the aggressor in this 
because all these things are there. That he is not 
entitled to the extreme emotional disturbance of 
something that's the product of his own actions. 
That he is not entitled to imperfect self-defense 
because he wasn't entitled to self-defense in the 
first place. 
And this idea that he was somehow reasoning 
it through is completely contradictory to the other 
defense he's trying to put on. He got up, he was 
able to know what he was doing enough to put two 
parallel bullet tracts through the chest of Henry 
Dennis Miera. 
With the medical records, even if we give 
the defendant the benefit of the doubt that those 
were his medical records, they were still not the 
medical records detailing the injuries that took 
place at the 7-Eleven. They were something that 
happened some years before that* Again, we don't 
have any medical records of the night because he 
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choose not to seek help. He sought to flee. He 
knew he must flee. As the instructions tell you, 
that is an indication of his guilty heart. 
Ladies and gentlemen, again look at all the 
evidence. Watch the tape. Watch it among 
yourselves a few times. Look at when these things 
are happening, the sequence at which times they1re 
happening. Who has told you what happened when. 
Realize the things about having to get the gun out 
from behind the shirt. Realize the packaging today 
as it is today and as it was then. Look at the 
sequence of when that door is opened. Look at how 
quickly he's shooting after he's hit. Look at Rios 
turn his heels and run, almost in one simultaneous 
motion with the left hook. And realize that what 
happened later that night was that the defendant not 
out of gallantry towards his wife, no not out the 
fear for himself, but just out of anger and perhaps 
out of meanness went ahead and flat killed Henry 
Dennis Miera, did so with a handgun. And shot at 
and tried to kill Manuel Rios and Junior Montoya. 
It is not a contest between which couple 
you prefer to have dinner with. It is a contest 
between which actually happened. And it is a 
contest between who, in fact, has been 
straightforward with you, which witnesses told you 
the truth* That is why I believe you will find the 
defendant guilty of murder, guilty of attempted 
murder, guilty of a second count of attempted 
murder, and guilty in each of those three counts of 
using a firearm in the commission of those acts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, could we 
approach briefly before? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Side-bar conference.) 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel for the 
defense, if you'd like to make your closing 
statement* 
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
Try as I'm sure that you will, because I 
know that you1re going to follow the law, you may 
never be able to put yourself in the shoes of my 
client that night. But that's the law. As judges 
of my client, as judging the facts and bringing back 
a verdict on my client, the law is that -- and all 
the law mentions, the circumstances arising here, 
the law is that you must put yourself in the shoes 
of my client in those same circumstances. 
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Scott and juror Michael Ross. You are excused at 
this time. You are not permitted to deliberate. We 
thank 
do it, 
this p 
If you 
you for your service. 
Again, it's an unfortunate thing to have to 
but you have helped us just by serving to 
oint in the proceedings and we appreciate it. 
•d like to remain, watch the final outcome, 
you may do so. But only those eight who are to 
serve 
thank 
deputy 
record 
as jurors can deliberate on the case. So 
you. 
I'll ask those eight members to follow the 
into the jury room. 
(The following proceedings were held in 
open court out of the presence of the 
jury.) 
THB COURT: You can be seated. For the 
, Counsel, let me just ask, in fact, it was 
Mr. Scott and Mr. Ross, isn't that correct, that 
were the alternate jurors? 
unders 
MR. LBMCKB: As we understood, your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: That's the way we 
tood it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, just so we're clear. 
Counsel for the defendant, you indicated that you 
wanted to make a motion for mistrial. 
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The record should reflect the jury has been 
excused and this would be an appropriate time to do 
that. Go ahead if you would like. j 
MR. FINLAY30N: Your Honor, during 
counsel' s opening part of his closing argument he 
referenced the character of our defendant, accusing 
us of packaging him as a Jimmy Stewart. Talking 
about Rios being in chains as he should be at the 
prison and our client sitting out here in the suit 
and glasses and comparing him to the video. He's 
not allowed to comment on the character of our 
client. It was never a point put at issue by us. 
We approached the bench and objected to that. 
THE COURT: You did. 
MR. FINLAYSON: And asked that there be a 
mistrial. 
We also took exception to -- we also take 
exception to Mr. Lemcke's bringing up the concealed 
weapon as showing our client's propensity to disobey 
the law, which I think is exactly what all the 
404(b) and 609 evidence is exactly trying to keep 
out. And that is trying to try Mr. Jiminez on the 
merits and not on his propensity to disobey the law. 
We would ask for a mistrial for that as well. 
And that -- and I think I've made my 
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objection clear on when Mr. Lemcke started into the 
fact that the jury had not been dealt with in a 
straightforward manner. I think he - - that the jury 
could take that and it is certainly reasonable for 
them to take 
them or that 
trial. It's 
that that we were hiding something from 
I have done something improper in this 
your Honor's province to decide whether 
there's something improper going on and I take 
exception to 
THE 
Mr. 
that. 
COURT: Thank you. 
Lemcke, your response to the motion for 
a mistrial on those three ground? 
MR. 
there --
THE 
MR. 
the idea that 
LEMCKE: Your Honor, first of all 
COURT: Pardon me. 
LEMCKE: There are three grounds and 
: -- we talked about the deportment of 
the defendant, you know, here and there. And that 
those are different affects is proper comment on the 
deportment of a witness. The defendant did take the 
stand in thii i particular case. His credibility is 
clearly at issue. We, in fact, attacked his 
credibility. In fact, the second --or the third 
thing that counsel complains about is that we talked 
about --
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THE COURT: Being unfairly dealt with. 
MR. LEMCKE: Oh, that the jury was not 
being dealt straightforward with. 
THE COURT: Or straightforward. 
MR. LEMCKE: And that is simply talking 
about I don't think that the defendant and his wife 
were telling them the truth. I was not commenting 
on Mr. Finlayson. If Mr. Finlayson has some ill at 
ease with that, I apologize to him. I do not even 
apologize for the process, though. Because I think 
I'm entitled to comment on the defendant, as any 
other witness, whether or not I believe he's telling 
the truth. And I think that so much of what he said 
was transparently false and that is the comment on 
that. 
The other issue is -- deals with Manuel 
Rios being in chains. That was mentioned at a 
different time. To hear counsel's complaint it 
would be, well, here is the defendant over here in a 
suit, and here is Manuel in chains. No, I talked 
about Manuel a lot. In fact, to comment in my 
rebuttal, where counsel said, oh, he's an NFL 
lineman, I said he's not an NFL lineman, he's a USP 
inmate. We've never sold him as a church warden. 
We've only let Manuel be Manuel. 
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1 And to somehow cobble together the comments 
2I on Manuel as a backslded comment on the defendant, I 
3 1 don't know If that shows something of the mind set 
4 1 of counsel, it's more so than what happened actually 
5 1 in court. So I don't think that his comments are at 
6 1 all well made. And his motion for mistrial 
7 I certainly isn't. 
8 THE COURT: Did you want to comment on the 
9 second ground? 
10I MR. LEMCKE: Which was? 
Ill THE COURT: The firearm, the -- counsel 
12 said --
13I MR. LEMCKE: Oh, on the firearm. The 
14 problem with that was that in his close 
15 Mr. Pinlayson went into a speech about, well, 
16 there's a second amendment. We're not talking about 
17 whether people are entitled to have them or not, 
18 there are permits* They had nothing to do with the 
19 case, the second amendment or people having permits. 
2 0 We never got into that. We weren't going to get 
21 into that. And Z have a right to rebut and come 
22 back and talk about we didn't talk about permits. 
23 We talked about the fact that he concealed a weapon 
24 and went into this. And that he has, among other 
25 things, a propensity for crime and aggression. And 
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that was, you know, clearly central to 
this case. 
So 1 bo somehow come out as thi 
the issues of 
s is 
everything that's said when I reference the 
defendant is somehow 403 or 404(b), is 
I get to comment on the defendant as a 
get to comment on the defendant as an 
that is what the issue is about. And 
complain about everything that comes i 
their client 
fallacious. 
witness and I 
actor. And 
to simply 
n against 
is violative and only there to smear 
him, just isn't true. 
THE 
Counsel. 
MR. 
COURT: Okay. It's your 
FINLAYSON: Nothing else 
guess I should -- I forgot to put one 
record. I'll submit those. 
THE 
MR. 
approach the 
believed I'd 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Okay. 
FINLAYSON: But when we -
motion, 
on that. I 
thing on the 
- we did 
bench when Mr. Lemcke indicated that he 
mischaracterized the law. 
COURT: On aggravated assault. 
FINLAYSON: On aggravated 
I think I'd ask the Court to instruct 
statute of aggravated assault. And Mr 
don't remember what you asked for the 
assault. And 
them on the 
• Lemcke, I 
judge to do. 
MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I asked you 
actually to do nothing. Except, you know, I did not 
object to you saying that the law of aggravated 
assault was not a part of this case. And that the 
different counsels disagree on certain issues in 
this, which is true. Also it should be part of the 
record that it was the defense who didn't want 
aggravated assault instructed in this particular 
manner. The instructions say that they contain all 
the law that's necessary and Mr. Finlayson chose to 
go beyond the jury instructions to get into an issue 
of law that we weren't -- that apparently they 
weren't set up for. 
THE COURT: I guess we could just deal with 
this last one, give the jury a supplemental 
definition of aggravated assault, if you wanted to 
do it. 
MR. LEMCKE: I would object. Your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: That's what I'd ask for. 
THE COURT: But you wanted me to, as I 
understand it, Mr* Finlayson, from our discussion 
here, you wanted me to tell the jury that your 
characterization of aggravated assault was correct, 
and I wasn't prepared to do that. 
MR. FINLAYSON: No, I did ask the Court 
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then to instruct them -- I'd read off the statute is 
what I had done to instruct them on serious bodily 
injury and aggravated assault because that's what I 
had read off of. 
MR. LEMCKE: 
counsel said broken 
injury under the law 
incorrect. 
THE COURT: 
were both arguing at 
arguable whether or : 
But at that point, your Honor, 
teeth constitute various bodily 
and that is absolutely 
Counsel, I appreciate what you 
this time. And it's at least 
not that Mr. Jiminez was a 
victim of an aggravated assault. So I hesitate to 
tell the jury that d efinitively. So I guess my 
question now is aggravated assault hae been 
explained -- it's been relied on by the defense as 
an explanation as to 
necessary. Wouldn't 
why they feel self-defense was 
it be helpful to now tell the 
jury in a brief instruction what aggravated assault 
is and let then decide for themselves? 
MR. LEMCKE: 
Honor* 
TBS COURT: 
way? 
MR. LEMCKE: 
know, it is not the 
I wouldn't think so, your 
And why would you feel that 
Well, because, again, you 
statute, the law which was read, 
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but it is th< a interpretation in the case law that 
matters whether or not this idea of broken teeth 
being serious bodily injury is there. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Well, what we - -
LEMCKE: Unless we want to start 
reading the several cases that deal with this. 
THE COURT: No, my suggestion is that we 
just define aggravated assault, nothing more. Not 
make any -- not instruct the jury as to whether 
broken teeth 
MR. 
your Honor. 
MR. 
are or are not --
FINLAY30N: That's what I would like, 
LEMCKE: And we would object to it. We 
think it's surplusage and we think that they've gone 
into the jury box now, it's an invasion. 
THE 
invasion. I' 
to draft the 
the elements 
COURT: I'm not sure that it's an 
11 consider. It counsel, if you'd look 
instruction having nothing more than 
of aggravated assault. I'll take a 
look and I'll take a look whether or not it's legal 
at this point to add a supplemental instruction to 
the jury. 
MR. 
THE 
FINLAYSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
COURT: Now, in terms of the motion for 
mistrial, I'll deny it. First of all, the comments 
70 
of the prosecuting attorney explaining to the jury 
that, in fact, Mr. Jiminez is not Jimmy Stewart, if 
I've characterized his description truthfully, is in 
my judgment not a comment on the character of 
Mr. Jiminez. Again in opening arguments and during 
Mr. Jiminez1 own testimony, the defendant attempted 
to present to the jury an appearance or an image of 
what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention 
was. It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to 
make an effort to contradict that image. And in my 
judgment, that's what Mr. Lemcke was trying to do. 
On the second ground, commenting that I 
believe something to do with the propensity to 
violate the law as shown by carrying an illegal 
firearm. It's a touchy area, I grant, but on the 
other hand the defense implied through its closing 
argument that Mr. Jiminez had a second amendment 
right to carry a firearm* 
It didn't quite go that far, but said words 
to th* effect of to the jury that haven't they heard 
about; the second amendment* The clear implication 
is that th* defendant has a constitutional right to 
have this gun* Apparently there's some evidence 
that he doesn't have a constitutional right to have 
a gun for various reasons. Among them possibly 
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because he's an illegal alien. 
The State didn't make that comment and, in 
fact, couldn't have made that comment in my 
judgmen 
1 do so. 
t. It would have been misconduct for them to 
But to follow-up and explain as they do that 
the issue is not so much that the defendant has a 
constitutional right to have a gun, but as to what 
the gun may show about his state of mind and who, in 
fact, was the aggressor. Which I think was the 
essence of what the prosecutor was saying, and again 
in my judgment is not prosecutorial misconduct. And 
I deny 1 
that he 
with in 
manner, 
that I 1 
the deft 
the motion for a mistrial on those grounds. 
And thirdly, the prosecutor's statement 
didn't feel that the jury was being dealt 
a straightforward manner or an honest 
Mr. Finlayson, I think if counsel had said 
bhink the prosecutor is lying to you --or 
ansa counsel, rather, is lying to you or 
misrepresented something to you, I would agree. But 
his statements can be construed that the defendant 
himself was lying or the defense witnesses were 
lying and the jury wasn't being told the truth. He 
didn't < accuse you personally of anything, and 
therefore again it wouldn't be prosecutorial 
misconduct in my judgement. There is no reason to 
declare a mistrial and so I won't. 
But I'll consider submitting an aggravated 
assault instruction 
And I'll try to take 
would be appropriate 
if you can draw one up quickly. 
a look at the law to see if it 
even though the jury has been 
sent to the jury room to deliberate to add that 
instruction at this 
We'll be in 
point. 
recess. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you. 
MR. LBMCKB: 
submit that I'd ask 
believe there's case 
I can't remember the 
like broken fingers. 
broken teeth do not 
level. 
THE COURT: 
law -- as a matter o 
aggravated assault* 
MR. LBMCKB: 
TBS COURT: 
jury that, Counsel. 
And your Honor, before I'd 
the Court to look at -- I 
law, it was Justice Zimmerman. 
case, but he said that things 
broken noses and I believe 
arise to an aggravated assault 
Your argument there is that by 
f law this couldn't be an 
Correct. 
I'm not prepared to tell the 
Let me just explain to them 
what aggravated assault is and draw their own 
conclusion. 
MR. PINLAYSON: Your Honor, it appears that 
7 1 1 
